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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Explosion of Ethnic Retributive Violence in Czechoslovakia 
at the End of the Second World War 
 
Bryson David Taylor 
 
 The end of the Second World War was not the end of the explosion of human 
rights abuses from the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe.  In Czechoslovakia as well 
as Poland, there were outbreaks of retributive violence driven toward the German ethnic 
minorities present within their liberated boundaries.  In both cases, the governments of 
Poland and Czechoslovakia began a state sponsored, and Potsdam Conference 
approved program, of “orderly and humane” expulsions.   While most twentieth and 
twenty first century historians have attributed these actions in Czechoslovakia as a 
continuation of the historical relationship between the Czechs and Germans of Bohemia 
and Moravia, this study’s contention is that these actions fundamentally altered the 
relations between the two groups by eliminating the Germans.  Czech-German relations 
had included not only competition and destructive actions, but also coexistence, 
cooperation and inter-marriage between the two groups. 
 This study utilizes primary and secondary source material to analyze the critical 
aspects of this relationship as it pertained to the Nazi occupation of the regions of 
Bohemia and Moravia and the postwar Czechoslovak administration of President 
Edvard Benes.  Under the direction of Reichsprotektor Konstantin von Neurath and then 
Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich, the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was 
polarized along ethnic lines between those who were German, those who could be 
Germanized, and those who were undesirable.  For the first time in Czech history, the 
traditional state of identity transience between Czech and German no longer existed.  
German atrocities, including the complete destruction of the village of Lidice as well as 
the arrest or destruction of all resistance groups pacified the Protectorate under the 
Nazis for the remainder of the war. 
 The suffering experienced under the Nazi occupation manifested itself as the 
Soviet Red Army liberated the region.  The newly freed Czechs took the opportunity to 
take revenge upon the Germans, arresting many as collaborators, deporting the rest.  
This was a dynamic shift in the postwar relations between the two ethnic groups.  
Further intensifying this change were the directives issued by Czech President Edvard 
Benes in the Great Decree, which further penalized Germans based substantially on 
their ethnic heritage rather than their actions during the war.  This study will further 
explore these policies as well as the effects of the international community.  The final 
portion of this study will analyze the long-term effects that the expulsion of Germans 
from Czechoslovakia had on the state’s future.  It will especially look at the outbreak of 
debate centered on the repeal of the Benes decrees and the Czech accession to the 
European Union, which clearly demonstrates the importance of the topic of research 
even in the venue of modern minority policies in the European Union and modern 
relations between the Czech Republic and Germany. 
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The Explosion of Ethnic Retributive Violence in Czechoslovakia 
at the End of the Second World War 
 
The Second World War marked the greatest explosion of human rights abuses in 
history.  The Nazi Third Reich sought the destruction of entire ethno-racial groups, the 
Jews and Roma (Gypsies) of Europe.  However, to claim that the unconditional 
surrender of the German Wehrmacht ushered in a time of Pax Europa, or even a time of 
healing and rebuilding to follow the chaos, death, and destruction that devastated the 
European landscape for the previous six years, would be to omit one of the single 
largest periods of forced migration in human history.  As the Soviet Red Army pushed 
back the Wehrmacht across the Eastern front, the newly liberated territories of the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia all began the 
arduous process of forcibly expelling their German minorities, the often-misnamed 
Volksdeutsche, to the soon to be occupied territories of the former Third Reich.  
Ultimately, the actions of these states, with the vague sanction of the Potsdam 
Agreement, would permanently displace between twelve and fourteen million people.1 
 Most western historians have attributed the explosion of retributive violence and 
forced expulsions toward the minority German populations of Eastern Europe, as 
merely a sudden explosion of chaotic retaliation for the atrocities committed by the Nazi 
Third Reich, as well as for the actions of the prewar population of Volksdeutsche during 
the Nazi occupation.  This approach to the narrative of the expulsions fails to consult the 
evidence effectively, choosing to overlook the actions of national leaders such as 
Edward Benes in their chosen course of action against their state’s minority German 
                                                     
1 It is important to note that the Potsdam agreement only approved the legal transfer of 
Volksdeutsche from the Soviet occupied territories, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, but other 
Eastern European nations forced their own German populations into Poland and 
Czechoslovakia to emigrate.   
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population.  The historical scholarship, which seeks to explain the expulsion of Germans 
from Eastern Europe as merely a (Nazi) German action, Eastern European reaction, 
also fails to address many of the questions that have arisen in the six decades after the 
expulsions.  Why did the expulsions occur following the Second World War, rather than 
during the haphazard drawing and redrawing of state boundaries at the end of the First 
World War?  Why, in a place considered to possess the most traditionally liberal 
government established in the wake of the Great War, did its leaders chose to remove 
the “problematic” segments of their German population through the clearly anti-liberal 
program of “wild” and “organized” expulsions?  Why did the Allied powers, the United 
States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and even France permit the expulsions by means 
that resembled those of German-inspired forced immigration and resettlement? 
 The historiographical scholarship that surrounds the expulsion of Germans from 
Czechoslovakia, as well as the rest of Eastern Europe, has expanded drastically over 
the last twenty years.  Alfred de Zayas in his works, A Terrible Revenge:  The Ethnic 
Cleansing of the East European Germans, 1944-1950 (1993), and Nemesis at 
Potsdam:  The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans:  Background, 
Execution, Consequences (1977), both provide a breakthrough in the use of primary 
sources and first hand-accounts into Western research of the expulsions throughout 
Eastern Europe.  However, de Zayas’s analysis of the sources collected tends to 
generalize expellee’s experiences throughout the East, with only nominal differentiation 
between Polish, Czech, Soviet, and Yugoslav experiences.   Benjamin Frommer’s 
National Cleansing:  Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia 
provides a significant overview of the process of retribution within Czechoslovakia, but it 
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does not address the psychological impact of the Nazi occupation and looks at the 
motivations behind the expulsions as solely an element in the continued reciprocal 
relationship of Czechs and Germans.  Historian Andrea Orzoff’s study, Battle for the 
Castle:  The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe 1914-1948, provides incredible insight 
into how the Czech leadership in its pursuit of a living national myth, assisted in the 
orchestration of ever-increasing tension between the Germans and Czechs.  However, 
where her work exclusively analyzes the events of the expulsions through the prism of 
nationalist mythology, this study will seek to address the analogous relationship 
between Czech ethnic expulsions and German racial destruction.   
Chad Bryant’s Prague in Black:  Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism is arguably 
one of the best studies of the psychological impact that the Nazi occupation of Bohemia 
and Moravia had on the Czech population.  Bryant’s work operates within the paradigm 
of a reciprocal relationship between Czechs and Germans.  This reciprocal relationship 
provides a valid paradigm for the preponderance of historic Czech-German Relations, 
but it fails to acknowledge one simple fact—the Germans occupied and planned to 
Germanize the bulk of the Czech population, but the Czech leadership actively sought 
and for the most part executed the complete removal of its German problem through 
expulsion.  Rather than following the dictum of action-reaction, the Czech authorities 
acted to settle the question of Czech versus German permanently.  Bryant’s work will 
play an integral role in this thesis.  Also, the latest publication that addresses the forced 
deportations of Germans from Eastern Europe, R.M. Douglas’s Orderly and Humane:  
The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War will play a significant role in 
the basis of this study.  Douglas’s work provides a well-rounded account of the 
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expulsions in relationship to all of the Eastern European nations from prewar through 
the fall of communism.2 
 This thesis contends that the existing relational tension between Czechs and 
Germans was superseded by the psychological impact of Nazi rule.  The outside force 
of Nazi rule induced Czech action toward Germans using methods similar to the Nazis 
without approaching the catastrophic ends that Hitler’s Final Solution envisioned.  The 
Czechs took the initiative to act in the interest of peace and stability in non-ethnic terms 
through the expulsion of the German population with whom they had shared these lands 
for centuries, regardless of their collaboration with or resistance to the Nazis.  Not even 
those Czechs whom were considered for Germanization were safe from the 
deportations once they were racially identified as “German.”  The Czechs acted 
unilaterally, legally and literally changing the ethnic demographics of their nation, in 
order to ensure that the events of the Second World War never repeated.  The influence 
of outside forces and pressures, coupled with the opportunity to end the competitive 
relationship between the two groups, induced one of the largest transfers of population 
in the twentieth century. 
 There is an uncanny correlation between the legal approach of the Nazi regime, 
and the postwar national councils of Czechoslovakia.  From evidence gathered from 
several sources, one may very well gather that the Nazi plans for the racial cleansing of 
the Protectorate provided the blueprint for the methods of the subsequent concentration 
and deportation of the Germans.  This paper will explore within the relevant research 
and resources for evidence of the psychological nature of the Nazi occupation, which 
                                                     
2 For the complete bibliographical references, see the bibliography located at the end of this 
paper. 
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led to Czech proactive measures against native Bohemian and Moravian 
Volksdeutsche.  Among these sources, it is important to note that there are some that 
date back to the 1950s, which means that they carry with them significant political 
baggage, derived from their partisan Czech, German, and Cold War origins.  Their use 
in most western scholarship does not add to their validity; thus, historians must examine 
these sources with a careful, critical eye.  For this thesis, the documents reproduced 
within these sources are utilized without reference to the accompanying text provided by 
the editor or author.3 
 It is also important to note, that in no way does this study seek to equate the 
deeds of the Czech government in the expulsion of their country’s German minorities 
with the barbarous and atrocious nature of the Nazi pursuit of the destruction of Jews, 
Roma, and others during the Holocaust.  Although there are considerable correlations in 
the manner in which both groups sought to deprive their victims of their own human 
status, to equate them on a scale of heinousness and barbarity would serve very little 
than to dilute the tragic legacy of the Holocaust, an endeavor that only revisionist 
historians would view as useful.  This study only seeks to demonstrate the relationship 
between the postwar expulsion policies and the means by which the Nazis deported 
Jews and others to concentration and extermination camps.  Both Germans and Czechs 
                                                     
3 These controversial sources include:  Jivi Dolezal and Jan Kren, eds.,  Czechoslovakia’s Fight:  
Documents on the Resistance Movement of the Czechoslovak People, 1938-1945, (Prague:  
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1964); and  Lesson from History:  Documents concerning 
Nazi Policies for Germanization and Extermination in Czechoslovakia, (Prague:  Orbis, 1960) ; 
and Theodor Schieder ed.  Documents on the Expulsion of the German Population from 
Czechoslovakia. Vol. 4, (Bonn:  Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 
1960). 
 
 
Taylor 6 
 
 
did this, but only the Germans chose the genocidal approach of the Final Solution, 
rather than only seeking deportation.   
 The organization of this paper will serve to highlight the special case of the 
expulsions in the regions of Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia.4  The paper will 
begin with a brief exploration of the historical relationship between Czechs and 
Germans in Bohemia and Moravia during the era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
after the First World War.  The paper will then begin to explore the actions and effects of 
Nazi administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia during the Second 
World War.  The policies of Czechoslovak president Edvard Benes and communist 
leader Klement Gottwald, as well as other prominent Czech leaders during the Second 
World War in the Protectorate and abroad, will be featured as evidence of the 
psychological impact on the Czech national consciousness created by the German 
occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.  This paper will then proceed to analyze critically 
the documentary records of both the Reichsprotektor’s administration and the Czech 
National Committees that emerged at the end of the Second World War.  It is in this part 
of the analysis that the clear connection between the wartime occupation and the post 
war deportations truly takes shape and proves to the reader that the Nazi policies 
pursued within the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia served as part of the 
inspiration and psychological breakthrough necessary for the perpetration of the 
expulsion of minority Germans from Czechoslovakia.  Ultimately, the Czechs went 
beyond the rules of coexistence and sought to end, once and for all, their relationship 
with the Germans. 
                                                     
4 For a broader historical survey of the expulsions’ effects throughout Eastern Europe, please 
refer to the works authored by Alfred de Zayas and Benjamin Frommer cited within this study.  
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Historic Czech-German Relations 
Bohemia and Moravia under the Habsburgs 
 In order to comprehend fully what happened between Czechs and Germans 
during and after the Second World War, the historical relationship between these two 
ethnic groups within the regions of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as other regions that 
eventually became Czechoslovakia, must be understood.  The historic tensions 
between these two groups began during the Thirty years war.  Though this war began 
as a contest for supremacy between Catholics or Protestants, it would later serve as a 
hallmark of nationalist mythology.  Thus, the story of the Battle of White Mountain 
transforms from a battle fought between a Catholic Habsburg Army and the protestant 
Hussites into a battle between German Catholics and Czech Protestants.  This is too 
simplistic an explanation for the battle as Germans and Czechs fought on both sides of 
the battle. However, the loss of the battle ultimately led to the subjugation of Bohemia 
and Moravia, and its rebellious Czech element, as territory of the Habsburg Empire for 
the next three centuries.  In an effort to consolidate its control over its rebellious 
territories, the Habsburgs deliberately moved significant numbers of German and other 
non-Czech nobles into the region in order to maintain the Habsburg dominion.  This 
enraged local Czech nobles and established the contentious relationship between 
Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and Moravia.5 
 In order to maintain the loyalty of the Czechs to their Habsburg rulers, the 
Austrian administration of the region permitted the Czechs to have significant freedoms 
while trying to centralize its power in the region politically and culturally through legal 
                                                     
5 Zdnek Fierlinger, “We Are Rectifying White Mountain,” (Prague:  Jednotny svaz cskych 
zemedelco, 1945) 3-4. 
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means.  The Czech language was permitted; however, all official government 
correspondence was required to be in German.  Government sponsored high schools 
throughout Bohemia and Moravia taught their students only in the German language.  In 
response to these “opportunities” provided by the government, Czechs opened private 
schools, which offered instruction in Czech.  Equally important to the liberal Germans in 
the Habsburg government was the relationship between language and religion.  The 
ebb and flow of the relationship of German action followed by Czech response 
continued to dictate the ethnic relations within Bohemian and Moravia.  As the Austrian 
authorities made more and more attempts to centralize their control the region, the 
Czechs responded with their own efforts to maintain their Czech identity and national 
consciousness.  Thus, succeeding generations of Czechs and Germans experienced 
transience in their identities.  Within local Czech-dominated communities, in order to 
avoid discrimination, Germans needed to masquerade as Czechs through their own 
bilingualism.  For individuals in official capacities, Czechs needed to demonstrate 
proficiency in German and be able to pass themselves off as pious “German Catholics.”  
Further muddying the waters of ethnic identity were numerous intermarriages between 
Czechs and Germans that created greater biological and cultural links between the two 
groups.  This transience of identity between “Germaness” and “Czechness” provided a 
level of equality amongst Germans and Czechs within the region, and for the most part, 
the two societies intermingled easily.6 
The principal author of the Czech nationalist narrative that sought to transform 
relations between Czechs and Germans, Frantisek Palacky, argued that the region of 
                                                     
6 Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 
1848-1948, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002) 16-20. 
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Bohemia and Moravia that was under Slavic, Czech control during the Middle Ages was 
a cradle of democracy.  According to Palacky, the Czechs were a “progressive hard 
working people” who created a variant of Slavic democracy that was unmatched in the 
world in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  However, in the fourteenth century, the 
arrival of German immigrants undermined the traditional values of democracy and 
ultimately ended the splendor of Czech civilization.  Palacky was the architect of the 
theoretical nationalist struggle embroiled in the religious alignment of the Battle of White 
Mountain.  In other words, for the Czech nationalist narrative, the battle was not a 
struggle of Protestant against Catholic, or for the expansion of the Habsburg Empire, 
but rather it was a struggle between Germans and Czechs for national dominance in 
Bohemia.  The repurposing of historical events such as the Battle of White Mountain is 
in no way without precedent in the construction of national narratives in the formation of 
nation-states.  However, in the case of Czechoslovakia, by the late nineteenth century, 
the creative transformation of the Battle of White Mountain from a religious struggle into 
a national-political struggle for supremacy became a hallmark of Czech nationalists in 
their struggles with their German counterparts.7 
 In the nineteenth century, the region’s Czech and German nationalists grew 
increasingly frustrated with the ease by which individuals could be German or Czech 
based entirely upon which group’s membership was most advantageous at the time.  
Czech nationalists took every opportunity to limit the transience of identity, or force 
Czechs to embrace their Czech heritage.  For most Czech nationals, however, the 
seemingly magnanimous steps of the Habsburg Empire to provide some autonomy to 
                                                     
7 Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe 1914-1948, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 36-38.  
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its ethnic enclaves kept them loyal to the empire.  Even when the Habsburg Emperor 
Franz Josef established the dual-monarchy of Austria-Hungary in order to squelch cries 
for independence from the Magyars, few Czechs expressed outrage that their own 
national group was not given the same opportunity.  It was not until the outbreak of the 
First World War that the Czech nationalist narratives began to gain traction in Czech 
consciousness and ushered in a change in the paradigm of Czech-German Relations in 
Bohemia and Moravia.8 
World War I and the Birth of Czechoslovakia 
 The Austro-Hungarian Empire took several pragmatic actions in an effort to stave 
off its demise throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and in the beginning of 
the twentieth.  The empire was an aging holdover from the Middle Ages that required 
massive transformation and reinventions to survive in the modern area.  By the early 
1900s, the Austrian Emperor Franz Josef faced significant nationalist movements that 
challenged the existing order.  His heir apparent, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
attempted to alleviate the internal pressures of nationalist sentiment by promising to 
decentralize much of the empire’s decision-making, which in turn would have granted 
greater autonomy to the Empire’s eleven national groups.  With the prospective 
succession from Franz Josef to Franz Ferdinand, it seemed that the empire would once 
again reinvent itself and survive in the age of nation-states.  However, the ethnic 
tensions, which plagued the Habsburg Empire since the nineteenth century, reached 
                                                     
8 King, 36-38. 
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critical mass in 1914 when the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by 
Serbian nationalists plunged the entire European Continent into war.9 
 The outbreak of the First World War presented Czech nationalists with an 
opportunity to begin agitating for an independent Czech state.  During the initial phases 
of the war, many of Bohemia’s Czechs, as well as Germans, served in the Austro-
Hungarian Army, demonstrating their continued support for the ruling dynasty, Emperor 
Franz Josef.  However, as the war dragged on, it consumed more treasure, blood, and 
lives.  Czech nationalists seized upon the flailing war effort and disgruntled public 
opinion, to begin pushing for independence.  When this effort appeared to fail, and the 
victory for the Allies seemed far more certain, Czech nationalists including Tomas 
Masaryk and Edvard Benes traveled to London and Paris to begin lobbying the Allied 
leadership of Britain, France, the United States, and Italy for the establishment of an 
independent Czech state.  The nationalist movement continued to gain momentum on 
the ground in Bohemia and Moravia through the clever use of propaganda to create a 
unified Czech nationalist narrative.10  
Palacky’s nationalist interpretation of Czech history was greatly embraced and 
heavily utilized by Masaryk, the future Czechoslovak president, as he lobbied people in 
the homeland to rally around the creation of a new, entirely Czech=led nation.  Further 
assisting Masaryk’s rhetoric of independence was the entry of the United States into the 
war against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  The American President, 
Woodrow Wilson, proposed fourteen points that provided the foundation for the postwar 
peace.  In this outline, one of the key foundations of peace in the future depended upon 
                                                     
9 G.J. Meyer, A World Undone:  The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918, (New York:  Bantam 
Dell,  2006) 7-14. 
10 Orzoff, 28-29. 
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the international acceptance of national self-determination in regions throughout Europe 
including Bohemia and Moravia.  To Woodrow Wilson, every nationality had the right to 
choose for itself, its future administration.  Under the direction of Masaryk and his future 
foreign minister, Edvard Benes, a group of Czech nationalists lobbied London, Paris, 
and Washington in an effort to assure the creation of a separate Czech state.  Following 
the logic of power politics, Masaryk also ordered newly formed Czech military units to 
the borders of the desired Czech nationalist state, theorizing that it would be a near 
impossibility for the Allies to take away territory already occupied by Czech forces. The 
British embraced the idea and quickly brought the reluctant Americans around.  With the 
support of two of the Big Four, the peace negotiation at Versailles announced the 
creation of a state that housed two of the Slavic national groups in Eastern Europe, the 
Czechs and the Slovaks, into the newly established state of Czechoslovakia.  This 
created a large state that helped buffer the rest of Europe from the Soviet Union.11 
Masaryk was a fervent patriot of the Czechoslovak cause.  He believed that the 
Czechoslovak Republic had the historic aptitude and the current potential to become a 
shining beacon of Democracy in Eastern Europe.  Benes, his lieutenant, on the other 
hand, has been described by historian R. M. Douglas as a true Machiavelli of the 
twentieth century, latching onto and pursuing any cause that ultimately resulted in the 
elevation of his own prestige and power.  Together, Masaryk and Benes labored 
exhaustively in the interest of Czech nationalists and ultimately created the First 
Czechoslovak Republic.12 
                                                     
11 David A. Andelman, A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today. (New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2008) 140-143. 
12 R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane:  The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World 
War, (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2012) 12-13. 
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During the First World War, the paradigm of German (Habsburg and native 
German nationalist) action, Czech reaction, continued to dictate the relationship 
between Bohemia and Moravia’s Czechs and Germans.  By the end of 1919, the 
Czechs came back to power after three centuries and ushered in a new shift in that 
paradigm, where no longer were the Germans’ the power in regional politics, but the 
Czechs seized the initiative in the relationship.  However, having power, keeping power, 
and continuing the Czech nationalist myth of republicanism proved to be the crux of the 
problems, which faced the newly developed Czechoslovak state in the coming decades. 
The First Czechoslovak Republic 
 The first major task before Masaryk and Benes was to secure the borders of 
Czechoslovakia.  The borders between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany 
remained unsettled.  Reports, both factual and fabricated, poured into the new 
Czechoslovak government of border skirmishes between German and Czech military 
and paramilitary units on the frontier.  Masaryk ordered the Czech military to the 
German border to provide greater security for Czech civilians against the German cross 
border raids.  However, the events still damaged Czech-German relations on the 
ground as Czech mobs rounded up and killed several Bohemian Germans as 
participants in, or at the minimum sympathizers, with the armed German guerilla units.  
Only later did government officials finally admit that the suggested number of violent 
incidents was significantly inflated.  Within the government, the first calls for the 
removal, sequestration, or at the minimum limited government participation of the 
German minority began.  Masaryk attempted to satiate the demands of his lieutenants, 
including Benes, by signing into law policies that excluded many Germans from civil 
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service jobs and official government positions.  These laws kept most Germans from 
serving in the state administration, but it did provide Germans with the opportunity to 
participate in local governments, especially those local administrations in the 
Sudetenland.13 
 The strained relationship between Germans and Czechs continued to fray, 
despite Masaryk’s attempts to satiate both sides to save the “golden age” of 
Czechoslovak republicanism and democracy.  For the most part, the artificial legal 
separation of the two groups served to limit the functionality of the traditional transience 
of identity.  Despite the attempts of the Czechoslovak government, in German 
communities, Czechs continued to act as Germans and in Czech communities, 
Germans acted as Czechs.  Even with increased government pressure there was 
significant difficulty in defining Czech, German, or some combination thereof.  The rise 
of right-wing extremist political parties (Fascist and Nazi parties) in Austria, Germany, 
and Italy increased nationalist paranoia within Masaryk’s democratic party, and even he 
became alarmed.  The rise of these parties, particularly the right-wing German led 
parties of Austria and Germany led Masaryk to approve further measures to minimize 
German influence in the state.  Even more alarming to Masaryk was the fact that Hitler’s 
Nazi Party in Germany was supporting the Sudeten Deutsch Partei (SdP) in local 
elections in the Sudetenland with monetary and political support.  Benes was justifiably 
concerned with SdP activities.   As seen in the SdP’s Action Program of 1938, the SdP 
made the total destruction of Czech culture its ultimate goal: 
The long-range aim must be:  to smash up Czech national consciousness, 
penetration into hitherto Czech linguistic territory by German settlement, drawing 
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(partly through re-settlement) the Czech part of the nation into an indissoluble 
mental and physical connection with Germany. 
 The German national measures against the Czechs will require on our 
part supreme skill and energy in the application of the fighting and organizational 
principles of the German nation.  The experience of our own German national 
struggle will have to prove itself.  The application of the necessary measures will 
start, on the one hand, with the days and hours of military combat measures, and 
on the other hand, must be laid down systematically for generations to come.14 
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World War II and Czech-German Relations 
The Weekend Crisis of 1938 
 By 1938, the upper hand in the relationship between Czechs and Germans in 
Bohemia and Moravia once again began to turn in favor of the Germans.  In February of 
1938, Adolf Hitler began a massive campaign within the German press, declaring 
natural solidarity between Reich Germans and those ethnic Germans residing in 
territories beyond the Reich’s current boundaries.  Specifically, Hitler referred to the 
millions of Volksdeutsche living under an oppressive government in Czechoslovakia.  
Hitler further argued that it was in the best interest for all Germans throughout Europe 
that the Reich expanded to include German nationals in the East.  This incorporation of 
territories inhabited by Germans would free ethnic Germans from oppression under their 
current regimes and unite them with the Greater Third Reich.  In Mein Kampf, Adolf 
Hitler described his desire for the Sudetenland to become a part of the greater Reich.  
For Edvard Benes, the President of Czechoslovakia, his justifiable concern over the 
loyalty of Sudeten Germans soon bordered on paranoia.  He authorized the order to call 
up reservists and all military personnel to begin training for the defense of the 
Czechoslovak State.15 
 The paranoia that began with Hitler’s rhetoric that declared the necessity for an 
expanded Reich only intensified when in March of 1938 Germany launched its 
Anschluss, the invasion and annexation, of Austria.  Benes immediately ordered Czech 
troops to the German frontier.  Further complicating the situation in April were the 
annual elections in the Sudetenland, scheduled for May 22, 1938.  The SdP, with 
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immense help from the Third Reich’s Bureau of Propaganda, owned a strategic 
stranglehold over the population in the region and expected enormous returns in the 
next election.  A powerful political outcome would give the Sudeten Germans the 
chance to call for independence from Czechoslovakia and annexation into the Third 
Reich.  This would prove to be a painful blow to the Benes’ administration.  Conceding 
dominance in the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany would subordinate the Czechoslovak 
state to German wishes and end the Benes administration’s dominance in 
Czechoslovak politics. 16 
By the weekend of May 20-21, 1938, it became clear that the crisis brewing in 
the Sudetenland provided Hitler with an opportunity to undermine the postwar 
international system, as well as the nation of Czechoslovakia in the interest of the 
Sudeten Germans.  Benes recognized this as a very real possibility and a very real 
threat to the independent Czechoslovak state.  His order to mobilize the Czechoslovak 
military and strengthen its forces in the Sudetenland appeared a show of strength 
toward Germany that was meant to “intimidate” the Germans into refraining from any 
actions along the German-Czechoslovak frontier.  In all actuality, it left Hitler with the 
opportunity to further “digest” the acquisitions made by the Reich in Austria before 
moving on to the Sudetenland, and ultimately the rest of the Czechoslovak state.17 
By September of 1938, the confluence of events left Hitler feeling very 
comfortable with the planned annexation of the Sudetenland.  Germans in the area 
were crying out for help, and his newfound alliance with Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Italy 
coupled with the continued international support for appeasement gave him a free hand 
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to operate in central Europe.  In the Munich “Diktat” of 1938, Adolf Hitler, with the 
consent of the British and French, took control of the Sudetenland.  Benes was certain 
that the British and French would never permit the unfettered expansion of the German 
Third Reich, and was taken totally by surprise with the announcement of the accord 
reached at Munich.  He ultimately resigned and fled abroad.  While this agreement only 
permitted the annexation of the Sudetenland, it became clear quickly that Hitler had 
designs for the remainder of Czechoslovakia.  By March of 1939, with the movement of 
German troops into the remainder of the Czechoslovak state, its existence came to an 
end.18  
On March 13, 1939, Adolf Hitler summoned the new Czechoslovak President 
Emile Hacha to Berlin.  In the early hours of March 15, 1939, Adolf Hitler himself 
presented Hacha with an ultimatum:  surrender all of Czechoslovakia to the Reich or the 
Wehrmacht would launch an invasion at six o’clock that morning.  Hacha was given a 
direct line to Prague on which he ordered the Czechoslovak military to stand down.  Any 
sign of resistance from the Czechoslovak military forces would result in the launch of a 
horrific attack on the people of Czechoslovakia.  Herman Goering even threatened the 
immediate bombing of civilian targets to demonstrate to the rest of the world the power 
of the German Luftwaffe.  At 4:30 that morning, Hacha gave a radio broadcast to the 
entirety of Czechoslovakia pleading with the population to remain calm and peaceful.  
The western regions of Czechoslovakia were incorporated into the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia.  Slovakia was granted independent Axis ally status, and 
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Hungary and Poland were subsequently awarded their own slices of Czechoslovak 
territory, which contained small minority Magyar and Polish populations.19 
As a foreshadowing for his future labors on behalf of an independent 
Czechoslovakia, Edvard Benes, having fled abroad, espoused the Czech national 
narrative.  The Czechs were the victims of Nazi aggression that ended the peaceful, 
equitable nature of the Czechoslovak State.  This national myth would be a cornerstone 
in Benes’ plans for retribution against the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia by 
making the Czechoslovak state the victim of unprovoked German aggression. 
[Our] land was, simply, violently, attacked...Czechoslovakia was known as a 
refuge for citizens of free nations and as the League of Nations’ most 
enthusiastic supporter.  There was no religious or sectarian persecution; Jews 
were not persecuted; nor was there racial persecution of any kind.  It was truly 
one of the most enlightened, developed and progressive democracies east of the 
Rhine….The conquest of Czechoslovakia must be the destruction of the very 
idea of freedom in central Europe….The whole world was willing to sacrifice 
Czechoslovakia.20 
 
The Occupation 
 The surrender of Czechoslovakia was a political victory for Adolf Hitler. German 
troops marched through the conquered streets of Prague, Brno and other cities 
throughout the region with virtually no resistance.  Some Germans welcomed the 
opportunity to supplant the Czech majority as the dominant presence in government, 
business, and politics in the newly established protectorate.  Not even the continued 
existence of an “autonomous” Czech government provided a counterweight to the 
ascension of Germans within the Protectorate.  However, as it turned out, occupying 
Czechoslovakia was easy for the Germans; establishing the supremacy of Nazi-German 
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Racial ideology was a much more difficult task.  Nazi German intelligence failed to 
portray accurately the complicated ethnic, social, and economic structures of 
Czechoslovakia.  In the wake of the German takeover, the Nazis presumed that all 
Germans throughout Czechoslovakia would embrace their “Aryan” identity and assume 
their role as the master race.  However, defining who was German, what was German, 
and how to be German proved difficult questions to answer.  The transience of identity 
experienced by Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and Moravia was alien, and even 
more so baffling, to the occupation forces.  In Nazi ideology, German blood was 
superior.  Therefore, why wouldn't these Germans, when freed from the “oppressive” 
Czech regime, stand and assume their rightful place at the top of the racial ladder in the 
region?  For many Germans, there were still significant advantages to masquerade as 
Czechs, and for many Volksdeutsche, being German meant little more than using the 
German language.21 
 The bi-ethnic culture of Bohemia and Moravia clashed directly with the Nazi 
ideal.  The Nazis explained human history as a continuous Darwinian struggle for 
supremacy amongst racial groups.  At the top of this racial chain of dominance were the 
mythical Aryans that settled in the region of present-day Germany.  True Aryans had 
blonde hair, blue eyes, and pale white skin.  From the Aryans the chain continued down 
through those of Nordic influence followed by the Anglo-Saxons and Latin races.  The 
Slavs were one of the lowest members of the Nazi’s racial hierarchy (excepting Jews 
and Roma), preordained to be the slaves of the Aryan descendants.   Because of their 
racial status, the Slavs inspired fear in Hitler as they could further dilute Aryan blood, or 
                                                     
21 Chad Bryant, “Either Czech or German: Fixing Nationality in Bohemia and Moravia, 1939-
1946,” Slavic Review Vol. 61 No. 4 (Winter 2002) 685-707. 
Taylor 21 
 
 
worse create an Aryan-Slavic hybrid bent on the destruction of the German Third Reich.  
As early as 1925, Nazi ideologues began to visualize the necessary removal of 
undesirable groups beginning within the German race itself.22 
In order to superimpose Nazi ideology onto the face of society, the Nazis needed 
an administrator, a Reichsprotektor, to direct the implementation of racial policy and 
Nazi ideals in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  To serve as Reichsprotektor, 
Hitler appointed Konstantin von Neurath, who while not a member of the Nazi Party, 
served the Fuhrer loyally.  Neurath believed that the implementation would have to be a 
slow comprehensive approach and not the immediate action desired by most Nazi 
officials.  Neurath feared a rebellion led by the Czechs of the Protectorate who 
continued to defy the occupation forces by displaying Czech national colors, singing 
nationalist anthems, and refusing to purchase German goods.  Neurath permitted 
displays of Czech identity and reserved punishment only for the most violent, defiant 
acts.23 
Neurath faced significant problems when he considered how to settle the “Czech” 
question in the Protectorate.  Nazi ideologues demanded the immediate removal of all 
the Czechs so that their property could be confiscated and redistributed to 
Volksdeutsche who returned to the Reich.  Practically, this plan faced significant 
complications.  The Reich’s population experts recognized that there were not enough 
Volksdeutsche to replace the number of skilled Czechs in the Protectorate’s industry 
and agriculture.  Czechoslovakia possessed the booming industries necessary for the 
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Third Reich’s future war effort.  Neurath summarized these findings in a memorandum 
dated August 31, 1940: 
The most radical and theoretically most perfect solution of the problem would be 
the complete expatriation of all Czechs from this country and its settlement by 
Germans. This solution, however, is impossible because there are not enough 
Germans for the immediate occupation of all the territories which will belong in 
the foreseeable future to the Greater German Area…. [A]n early realisation of the 
radical solution is likely to be impossible, unless one were to put up with fallow 
fields and deserted cities.24 
 
What Neurath proposed in order to maintain the industrial and agricultural output 
of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was a radical departure from Nazi racial 
ideology.  Instead of bloodlines becoming tainted by a singular drop of non-Aryan blood 
within a person’s racial pedigree, Neurath argued that the special case of interracial 
mingling that occurred within the borders of Czechoslovakia created a Germanesque 
quality amongst a significant portion of the population that made them suitable for 
potential Germanization.  This would allow the vast majority of Czechs to remain in the 
Protectorate and maintain the necessary industrial output for the Wehrmacht.  In the 
same memorandum, he claimed: 
Taking a close view of the population of the present Protectorate area one is 
surprised at the great number of fair-haired people with intelligent faces and well-
shaped bodies, people who would not stand out unfavorably even in the Central 
German and South German area, not to speak of the area east of the Elbe River.  
In view of the strong mixture of blood strains with Germanic peoples during the 
past thousand years I consider it quite possible that for this very reason alone a 
large portion of the population may be allowed to remain in Bohemia and 
Moravia.25 
 
Hitler approved Neurath’s plan.  He approved the removal of only the most 
undesirable racial elements (Jews and Gypsies), subversives (communists), and the 
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genetically inferior (psychologically insane and homosexuals).  The directives from 
Berlin required preferential treatment for natural born Germans, and those descended 
from mostly German families.  The radicalized laws of the Nazi Third Reich were in this 
directive, as individuals were to be classified into three lettered groups.  The primary “A” 
class group consisted of only the most loyal Germans, returning Germans who had 
immigrated to the Reich from Czechoslovakia, and individuals who underwent “national 
mutation” and swore allegiance to the Reich only.  The “B” class consisted of individuals 
of German or Czech backgrounds who were skilled laborers, demonstrated little if any 
resistance to the occupation forces, and considered necessary for the future of the 
Reich.  Only “C” class individuals, the racially inferior, communists, and other 
undesirables were candidates for detention, segregation, and ultimately destruction.26 
Under the occupation administration of Konstantin von Neurath, the traditional 
Czech-German relationship maintained some degree of continuity in the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia.  While the Nazi’s dealt decisively with extreme acts of defiance, 
they permitted the two groups to maintain their uneasy coexistence.  Disgruntled 
Germans and Czechs attempted to denounce other Czechs as communists, and preyed 
upon the property left behind by deported Jews.  However, within Czech and 
Communist circles, resistance movements began to take hold in response to Nazi 
actions.  These groups launched significant covert sabotage operations designed to 
slow the overall production of war material.  These acts of defiance crippled Neurath’s 
reputation with higher-ranking Nazi officials in Berlin.  Further detracting from Neurath’s 
authority was the presence of Karl Hermann Frank, an SS leader and Sudeten German 
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with little regard for Neurath’s methods, who continuously reported the shortcomings of 
Neurath’s leadership to Berlin.27 
 The final straw fell when 100,000 gallons of petroleum, the lifeblood of the 
Wehrmacht, was set on fire in a resistance sabotage operation.  This coupled with the 
constant complaints from SS, Wehrmacht, and other Nazi officials led Hitler to meet with 
his lieutenants Himmler and Goebbels to appoint Neurath’s successor.  Hitler gave top 
priority to the effective Germanization of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and 
that this new Reichsprotektor would ensure that this Germanization would provide the 
prototypical approach for the rest of Europe.  On September 27, 1941, Hitler named one 
of the Reich’s greatest and most enthusiastic soldiers, Reinhard Heydrich to be the new 
Reichsprotektor.  Heydrich was the head of the Reich Security office, the founder of the 
Einsatzgruppen and soon-to-be architect of the Final Solution, making him the perfect 
leader to Germanize the Protectorate efficiently.28 
 Heydrich’s reputation as a loyal lieutenant of Adolf Hitler was only reinforced by 
his appearance; he was the Nazi ideal.  His blonde hair, blue eyes, and keen sense of 
racial superiority made him a prototypical soldier in Hitler’s Nazi party.  Heydrich was 
the founder of the Gestapo intelligence arm.  He proudly embodied the racial rhetoric 
embraced by Hitler.  Within days of his arrival in Prague, he began to challenge the 
existing Czech-German relationship and would forever change Czech-German 
Relations. 
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The Protectorate under Reinhard Heydrich  
 Shortly after his arrival in Prague, Heydrich called a meeting of the leading 
German authorities of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to declare his plans for 
the Protectorate.   
The situation in the past few weeks, as a matter of fact, has been such that one 
may say, the unity of the Reich was undoubtedly in danger.  This region was in a 
situation where there was such a ferment below the surface that one can only 
say that it was essential to take prompt action.  And I should like to say this quite 
openly:  the fault lies not only with the enemy, it also lies with us, the Germans, 
because not all Germans who came to this region were imbued with the idea that 
this is a battlefield in which every individual German, regardless of any questions 
of competence, must also, in his role as a fighter, achieve the victory of the 
German race.  Every German, who holds a leading position here, must consider 
himself to be a political soldier of the Fuhrer…. 
 
…This space is a heart piece of the Reich and we can never tolerate—this is 
demonstrated by the historical development of Germany—that the dagger blows 
against the Reich always come from this space…As to the final Germanisation of 
this space… I must have to make a register from the racial national point of view.  
This, therefore means that I must have the opportunity, using most diverse 
methods and passing through various backdoors, to screen the entire population 
as to its national and racial background.29 
 
Heydrich recognized the importance of Germanizing the protectorate as it was a 
necessity for war material production and for the success of the Nazi racial program for 
the rest of Eastern Europe.  Thus, Heydrich maintained a twofold mission in the 
protectorate.  He needed to secure the industry of the Protectorate, especially the 
Skoda Works, against the threat of sabotage. Simultaneously, he needed to put an end 
to the transience of identity within the region by strictly, “scientifically” defining who was 
German, or candidates for Germanization, and those who needed to be cleansed from 
the genetic racial profile of the region.  Heydrich brought a zealous determination to the 
position of Reichsprotektor, so he chose to accelerate the racial identification that began 
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under Neurath.  In the thick soup of “Czechs” and “Germans” that existed in the 
Protectorate, Heydrich’s enthusiasm for enforcing Nazi racial ideology made him the 
perfect candidate to separate them.30 
Heydrich ordered the Nazi SS to begin massive surveillance operations 
throughout the protectorate in an effort to curb resistance operations.  For the most part, 
Heydrich viewed communist resistance organizations as the source for the worst acts of 
sabotage, and therefore ordered SS to focus its crackdown on communist party 
activities.  Within the first weeks of Heydrich’s administration, nearly 2,000 Czechs and 
Germans were tried by summary courts for actions against occupation forces, the vast 
majority of whom were convicted and sent to concentration camps, a few faced capital 
punishment for their actions.  It is important to note that the Hacha government and not 
the SS, in fact, captured the majority of the anti-Nazi Germans rounded up during the 
Heydrich administration.  The continued existence of the Hacha government depended 
entirely upon its usefulness to the German authorities.  For the Hacha government, 
subversives were a threat to its survival.  Thus, the natural antipathy between the 
Hacha regime and the resistance made many of these arrests possible.  The Hacha 
government and their supporters saw the subversives as a threat to their own survival 
as a Nazi puppet regime.  Through the use of terror by his own administration and its 
loyal, subservient Hacha puppet government, Heydrich maintained order in the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.31 
Heydrich immediately began plans to use scientific methods to categorize racially 
those who were German, or possessed enough German physical traits necessary for 
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Germanization.  Heydrich equipped SS teams throughout the Protectorate with mobile 
x-ray labs that assisted with the classification of German or Slavic tendencies based 
entirely upon the shape of an individual’s skull.  Heydrich recognized that Neurath was 
right to fear a possible uprising within the Protectorate.  So that Czechs would not be 
alarmed by the mass racial classification of society, Heydrich announced that the labs 
were to perform mass inoculations.  As these Rontgensturmbahn units moved from 
neighborhood to neighborhood, they began to paint a genetic racial map for Heydrich to 
use in the deportation of those deemed racially unsuitable, while keeping good 
Germans and Germanizable Czechs in the Protectorate.  In a report to Berlin, Heydrich 
summarized his plan to classify the entire Protectorate: 
National Registration. 
 
Independently of these measures—camouflaged under the motto of the 
introduction of the German Kennkarte as a domestic passport—the national 
registration of the entire population of Bohemia and Moravia, which alone will 
produce a complete picture of the percentage of those who are fit for 
Germanisation, is proceeding according to age groups within the framework of a 
medical examination. 
Five mobile X-ray units—the first of which has already started operating 
together with the commandos made up of racial investigators from the Race and 
Settlement Head Office—will subject the entire population to a systematic 
examination and provide the scientific data needed for subsequent 
Germanisation.  The need for the systematic anti-TB fight, which serves as an 
official cover, has been conveyed to the population by all available means of 
propaganda.32 
 
Heydrich approached the classification of divisions along racial lines further as he 
went about the maintenance of racial order with brutal bureaucratic regulatory 
efficiency.  Already under Neurath, a 1940 Reichsprotektor decree required marriages 
to be approved by local officials.  It further stated that any Czech female found to have 
sexual relations with a German man faced immediate incarceration and then transfer to 
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a concentration camp.  The law required Czech mothers with German husbands to raise 
their offspring as German children.  Failure to do so resulted in the incarceration and 
deportation to a concentration camp for the mother.  Now, to ensure societal 
compliance with the racial legal codes, under another ruse, the Heydrich administration 
issued identification cards that clearly labeled Germans, Germanizable Czechs, and 
undesirable Czechs.  Heydrich began to superimpose racial divisions within a 
Protectorate society that once boasted a significant population of chameleons, who 
utilized the transience of identity between German and Czechs.33 
Heydrich’s administration of the Protectorate followed a careful, methodical path 
toward Germanization and pacification.  Whereas, in Poland, the Nazi occupation forces 
used indiscriminate terror to pacify the population into compliance, Heydrich utilized 
brutal police and bureaucratic efficiency to pacify the population of the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia.  Within a matter of weeks, acts of sabotage and resistance 
became a rarity within the Protectorate.  The production of materials for the 
Wehrmacht’s war machine continued to increase, and it appeared that the Heydrich 
administration successfully squelched any possibility of upheaval within the Protectorate 
through the careful use of terror as well as carefully made concessions designed to 
keep industrial workers satisfied.  Heydrich superimposed Nazi racial ideology upon the 
society of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and created a thick line that 
separated Czechs and Germans, which never before existed.  Suddenly the 
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identification of Czech or German became as simple as the letters typed on an 
identification card.34 
Legalizing Deportations, Concentration and Confiscation 
 The administration of the Nazi Third Reich became a hallmark for bureaucratic 
documentation as paper trails for every government action could be found at the end of 
the Second World War.  The Nazi execution of the Nuremburg Racial Laws and the 
Final Solution were of no exception.  The Nazi authorities in the Third Reich and in the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia served entire households of Jews, Gypsies, and 
racially unsuitable Czechs with orders to clear out of certain areas within a twenty-four 
hour period with few or no personal possessions.  Nevertheless, the bureaucratic 
paperwork never stopped, as confirmations of executive orders, reports of property 
confiscated, and subsequent deportation documents served as corroborative evidence.  
The Nazi approach to racial cleansing in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was 
not an indiscriminate round up of undesirables, but rather a carefully calculated and 
deliberate process. 
 The Nazis utilized the same legalistic approach that they patented in the German 
homeland.  Orders for relocation that claimed to be in the “best interest” of the Jews 
were served with a very specific deadline.  Many of the Jews still bought into the 
charade produced by the Nazis that they were being located to self-governing Jewish 
ghettos such as the one established at Theresienstadt.  However, from the moment 
they gathered in the ghettos, the illusion was over as they were forced to give up 
additional personal property.  The Nazis stripped these people of their dignity, forced 
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them to wear armbands to identify themselves, and appropriated their property for use 
by other Germans or the Third Reich.  This legacy of separation, concentration, and 
deportation to camps became the blueprint for population transfers at the end of the 
Second World War.35 
Benes Abroad 
 As the Nazi authorities in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under 
Konstantin von Neurath and then Reinhard Heydrich consolidated their control, Edvard 
Benes was not complacent abroad.  When the Czech government-in-exile began to take 
shape in London during 1940, Benes took an immediate leadership role and ultimately 
became its president.  For some Czechs, Benes remained stained by the international 
stigma of his apparent failure to challenge the decisions of the Munich Conference that 
sought to appease Hitler, despite the fact that the West had more or less forced him to 
accept the agreement.  This, in combination with the legal necessity of reestablishing 
Czechoslovakia’s territorial integrity, made Benes’ first critical policy endeavor amongst 
the Allies, the nullification of the Munich Agreement.  Benes lobbied heavily with the 
leadership in Britain for the nullification of the Agreement.  While this did not happen 
until the middle of 1942, the Allied governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, 
along with the then neutral United States recognized the Czechoslovak Government-in-
Exile, and began formal diplomatic relations with it.36 
Benes succeeded in his resumption of the role of President in the now 
recognized Czechoslovak government-in-exile. He then turned his attention to the issue 
of prewar Czechoslovakia’s German minority.  Having been one of the chief proponents 
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of a legally minimized role in government and administration for the Sudetendeutsche, 
Benes began to lobby for, at the minimum, partial removal of the Sudetendeutsche from 
postwar Czechoslovakia.  Early in 1940, communications provided by the Czech 
underground indicated a growing sentiment within the Czech community that any 
postwar peace would require the forced removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia.  
Throughout the end of 1941, Benes began to declare publicly the need for a solution to 
punish the Germans of Europe and redraw the ethnic map of central and Eastern 
Europe in the interest of a lasting peace.  In an article in Foreign Affairs, Benes 
declared, “It will be necessary after this war to carry out a transfer of populations on a 
very much larger scale than after the last war.”  Similar sentiments were expressed by 
the Polish government-in-exile that also declared its desire for a lasting peace based 
upon the removal of its own German minority.37   
 The Allied leadership frowned upon Benes’ public declarations for the need of 
population transfers at the end of the war.  At the time, the unconditional surrender of 
Germany appeared a distant hope.  The Soviet Union and United States had only 
recently entered the war; its course was far from certain.  The British maintained hopes 
that they could foment rebellion within the Third Reich, and Benes’ sabre rattling served 
only to supply Goebbels with an unending string of propaganda to mobilize Germans 
throughout occupied Europe.  Western public sentiment was far from in favor of 
population transfers that violated basic rights.  Without a radical change in public 
opinion, Benes’ would be forced to consider other, “alternative” transfers within 
Czechoslovak borders, creating ethnic German enclaves within the Czechoslovak state.  
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Unwittingly, Benes set the gears into motion that ultimately made the forced deportation 
of millions of Germans possible. 
The Assassination of Heydrich and the Nazi Retaliation 
Benes understood that Machiavellian power calculations dictated the nature of 
wartime politics, and therefore, he demanded that the Czech resistance demonstrate 
the Czech people’s willingness to pay any price to defeat the Nazis.  These actions 
could provide Benes with invaluable political capital, which he could then use to 
leverage the Allies into approval of his postwar plans.  In weekly radio addresses, 
Benes incited his people to take actions to sabotage or frustrate the Nazi occupational 
forces.  When Benes secured British recognition for the provisional Czech government-
in-exile, he authorized Czech security agents attached to the British Intelligence service 
to begin plans to parachute operatives into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to 
commit additional acts of sabotage.  On the surface, these acts served as signs of 
resistance toward the occupational forces, but they also served Benes larger political 
agenda.38 
 The appointment of Reinhard Heydrich to the position of Reichsprotektor and the 
subsequent pacification of the Protectorate enraged Benes.  The Allied leadership 
questioned the loyalty of the Czechs to the cause and shunned Benes.  It was out of 
this frustration that the plan to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich was born.  In January of 
1942, Czech agents were dropped into the Protectorate under orders to kill Heydrich.  
Kept in the dark about this mission until the last minute, underground resistance 
leadership pleaded with the agents and with the Benes government to cancel the plan.  
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The leadership on the ground understood what the ramifications of assassinating one of 
Hitler’s most prized lieutenants would be, and even Benes’ communist counterpart, 
Klement Gottwald, declared the folly of such an attempt on Heydrich’s life.  Despite the 
constant pleas from the resistance movement inside the Protectorate, Benes remained 
steadfast in his conviction that the assassination of Heydrich would make the Allies 
sympathetic to the Czechoslovak government.  Benes issued an order declaring that the 
operation would be in the best interest of the Czechoslovak people.  On May 27, 1942, 
the Czech agents launched the attack on Heydrich’s car, mortally wounding him.39 
 For Hitler, the assassination of Heydrich served as confirmation of his own 
inclination to answer resistance with utmost brutality, and he demanded immediate 
reprisals against the Czechs.  Heydrich’s second-in-command, Karl H. Frank, took 
control of the situation in Bohemia and Moravia, but slowly executed the Fuhrer’s 
orders.  Frank, perhaps the most knowledgeable Nazi official in the Protectorate, 
understood that brash action could very easily foment rebellion in the Protectorate and 
cripple the Wehrmacht’s operation on the eastern front.  So long as Heydrich lived, 
Frank satiated Hitler by promising to pursue the individuals responsible along with 
anyone connected with the plot.  However, when Heydrich eventually died from his 
wounds, Hitler renewed his call for retributive acts of extreme violence.  The 
collaborationist Czech government rounded up and tried four thousand members of the 
resistance, and sentenced fifteen hundred of those to death.  This was not enough of a 
reprisal.  Hitler demanded that an example be made of the Czechs so that no occupied 
people dared to assassinate its ruling Nazi officials.  Hitler ordered Frank to pick an 
isolated village that had few industrial workers for total destruction.  SS Einsatzgruppen 
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were to execute the male inhabitants of the city on the spot, women were to be 
gathered and deported to concentration camps, and children were to be separated into 
those who were Germanizable and those destined for concentration camps.  The village 
was then to be razed to the ground so that no record of its existence would be found.  
For this act of reprisal, Frank chose the village of Lidice for its optimal effect, because of 
its short distance from Prague.40 
 The aftermath of the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich left the Czech 
nationalist resistance decimated.  The majority of its leadership, and most skilled agents 
were either dead or imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps.  Communists that were 
uninvolved in the plot were captured based on their interactions with nationalist 
resistance figures.  For the remainder of the war, the Czech resistance was practically 
non-existent.  In the boastful words of Karl H. Frank in his summation report of the 
retaliation for the assassination: 
After the civil state of emergency, imposed as a result of the assassination of SS-
Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich, was raised in the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia on July 3, 1942, the greater part of the population has 
calmed down considerably.  The measures taken during the civil state of 
emergency: 
1. Arrest of 3,188 Czechs  
2. The shooting of 1,357 Czechs following death sentences passed by 
Courts Martial in Prague and Brunn, 
3. The razing of two Czech Villages Liditz (95 houses) and Lezaky (8 
houses), 
4. Discovery of the perpetrators and death of the assassinators after a 
severe fight 
Re-established peace and order in a short time and made the armaments 
contribution and harvest in the Protectorate secure. 
 
The maintenance of the present political line, that is: 
Firm action, individual political measures taken, the emotional atmosphere 
artificially produced by us and the wearing down of the nerves of the Czechs 
according to plan, things which increased the fear of the population to the point of 
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giving rise to rumors about a forthcoming decimation of the entire nation—proved 
to be correct. […]41 
 
Internationally, Benes received in exchange for the lives of hundreds of Czechs, 
the exact power he wanted.  The draconian measures implemented by the Nazi’s in 
retaliation for the assassination polarized Czech society along the very ethnic divisional 
lines that the Nazis helped to create.  The call went out to remember Lidice, and the 
lives crushed by the tyrannical Nazi regime.  Until the end of the war, very little was 
asked of the Czechoslovak people by the Allied leadership because they had already 
paid a heavy price.  Benes publically declared on many occasions that the presence of 
Germans in the Sudetenland would be an impediment to lasting peace.  The Czechs on 
the ground in the Protectorate were left at the mercy of Karl H. Frank with little or any 
protection provided by the government-in-exile in London or the Czechoslovak 
Communist leadership in Moscow.42 
The Occupation after Heydrich 
The appointment of Karl Herman Frank as Heydrich’s successor left the 
Protectorate under yet another brutal Reichsprotektor.  The SS continued its reign of 
terror by holding every citizen of the Protectorate responsible of even the most 
seemingly benign actions.  The citizenry of the Protectorate actively assisted the SS by 
denouncing neighbors and family members for personal gain.  Once a neighbor or 
family member was arrested, his or her property came up for grabs, thus making 
denunciations economically advantageous for the general population.43  Under Frank, 
                                                     
41 “Report to the Fuhrer for the period from May to September 1, 1942”  in Lesson from History, 
144 
42 Douglas, 42. 
43 David D. Kelly, The Czech Fascist Movement, 1922-1942, (Boulder, Co: Eastern European 
Monographs, 1995) 121. 
Taylor 36 
 
 
the industrial output of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia reached record highs, 
and solidified Frank as the undisputed Nazi leader in the region.  The only significant 
change that occurred under Frank was the easing of pressure for the execution of racial 
cleansing in the Protectorate.  The changing tides of the war led the Nazi Leadership in 
Berlin to call for the redirection of all resources in support of the total war effort.  In 
preparing the German people for the brutal war of attrition following Stalingrad, Joseph 
Goebbels redirected the focus of the population to the cause of the war: 
…now they can see the underlying cause:  rich peoples, led by a refined and 
insatiable plutocracy and its most radical offshoot, Bolshevism, overloaded with 
territorial possessions and raw resources, have forced the German people along 
with the Axis powers to take up arms to decide the vital issue of whether in future 
we will have an adequate basis for our national life, or even lose the completely 
insufficient basis for this which we already possessed. [...] 
 
Every birth brings pain.  But amid the pain, there is already the joy of a new life.  
It is a sign of sterility to shy away from new life on account of the pain…Our age 
too is an act of historical birth, whose pangs carry with them the joy of richer life 
to come.  The significance of the war has grown as its scale has increased it is 
relentlessly at work, shattering old forms and ideas, and directing the eyes of 
human beings to new, greater objectives…In an age which like never before 
offers us the choice between the highest fortune and deepest catastrophe of our 
Reich, we stand firm as a people, determined and ready to work and fight so as 
to fulfil (sic) the ultimate meaning of the war.44 
 
As the leadership in Berlin provided new impetus for production in the execution 
of the war, Frank immediately reallocated his resources.  He discontinued pursuance of 
Heydrich’s racial categorization in favor of redoubling efforts to increase industrial 
output.  Courts-martial sentenced thousands to death or hard labor in concentration 
camps.  Frank knuckled down on the population of the Protectorate, and transformed 
the Czechs of the Protectorate into a vital war human resource for the German war 
effort.  Germanizable Czechs were considered prime candidates for conscription into 
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the military services.  The Third Reich also utilized other portions of the Czech 
population as well as other eastern peoples as forced laborers in wartime industries, as 
well as in industries necessary for the survival of German non-combatants on the home 
front.  These slave laborers as well as those employed in the all-important industries of 
the Protectorate formed part of the backbone of German war production throughout the 
remainder of the war and presented problems for the government-in-exile in London 
and its communist counterpart in Moscow.45 
By late 1944, Frank’s continued suppression of resistance within the Protectorate 
proved that the Allies had very short memories when it came to the loss of Lidice.  The 
lack of an attention-grabbing act of resistance as the tide of the war turned left 
questions in the minds of the Allied leadership.  Were the Czechs doing enough to resist 
the leadership of the Protectorate, or were they, in fact, collaborating with the Nazis?  
For Benes and Gottwald, the argument remained that the Nazi retribution for the 
assassination of Heydrich had destroyed the infrastructure and leadership necessary for 
large organized acts of overt sabotage.  Due to this, Czech acts of resistance 
manifested themselves as work slowdowns, minor incidents of sabotage (broken tools 
and instruments), and expressions of support for resistance provided in the privacy of 
Czech homes.46 
The struggle between Frank’s security forces and Benes and Gottwald’s 
supporters came to a head in the final throes of the Second World War.  As the Soviet 
Red army broke through German lines near the eastern Czechoslovak border in March 
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1945, they began to march on Prague.  At the same time, American forces under 
General George S. Patton closed to within twenty miles of the state capital.  Benes and 
Gottwald each pleaded with the Allied leadership, and specifically with Stalin, for the two 
armies to allow the Czechs to revolt against the Nazi occupation forces and free 
Prague.  Reluctantly both armies stopped short of the city and waited for the remnants 
of the Czech national and communist resistance forces to revolt.  On May 5, 1945, the 
revolt was launched as Czech forces attacked entrenched German positions throughout 
Prague.  For the Germans of the city, their worst fears were realized.  They read reports 
from the Eastern Front declaring what came with revolt and the Soviet Red Army.47 
…The supply and rear guard detachments that follow [the front lines] 
systematically loot every house under the eyes of tolerant officers….Reports 
from eyewitnesses and other sources attest to extensive occurrence of rape, 
usually under the influence of alcohol,  Girls and women of all ages from 8 to 68 
years old are violated, sometimes by up to 24 officers and Red Army regulars at 
a time…it is clear that enemy troops fire indiscriminately at the civilian 
populations…48 
 
The rout of Nazi occupation forces that followed the Prague uprising left the 
Sudeten Germans as well as other German nationals at the mercy of the liberating and 
revolutionary forces.  In victory, the Soviet Red Army responded as conquerors, they 
pillaged and raped women of all ages in the liberated territories of Ukraine, Belorussia, 
Poland, and the former Third Reich.  These liberated populations then launched their 
own campaigns of retributive violence against Germans as well as their own plans of 
deportations back to the territory of the former Third Reich.   However, in addition to 
this, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, in collusion with its communist 
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counterparts, placed their own plans intended to end rather than renew the traditional 
prewar Czech-German relationship. Their methods inspired by the actions of other 
states in the Twentieth Century including the Greco-Turk population exchange of the 
1920s and the activities of the Nazi regime in the Protectorate would redraw the ethnic 
map of Central Europe further at the end of the Second World War. 
Planning the Expulsions 
In the aftermath of the destruction of Lidice, Benes intensified the rhetoric of 
deportations.  In multiple speeches, he argued that the Germans of Central Europe 
were inherently a group bent on subterfuge, war, and destruction.  Thirty years and two 
world wars proved that the German people failed to appreciate the gravity of the chaos 
and destruction they had created.  Benes urged the allied governments to redraw the 
maps of Europe along ethno-racial boundaries because, as he contended, the presence 
of ethnic minorities within nation-states created the political unrest that was ultimately 
the source of war.  In other words, the deportation of Czechoslovakia’s 
Sudetendeutsche and other Volksdeutsche from throughout Eastern Europe back to the 
German heartland was in the interest of a lasting peace on the European Continent.  
While the responsibility of the Volksdeutsche and Sudetendeutsche for the war can be 
debated, blanket responsibility cannot be assigned to any one ethnic or racial group.49 
Even before the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, Benes struck a blow 
against collaborationist Czechs and Germans.  In January 1942, Benes made his first 
strike against collaborationist Czechs and the minority German population.  
Czechoslovakia, along with Poland and other governments-in-exile present in London 
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signed the St. James Declaration.  The declaration, signed a year later by the United 
States and United Kingdom, became the legal basis for war crime tribunals, and more 
explicitly, the Nuremburg Trials.  The governments, which signed this agreement, 
agreed in principle to seek out, incarcerate, expedite, and to punish all Nazi war 
criminals.  This included all international war criminals no matter their race or nationality.  
In the case of Benes and Czechoslovakia, the question of guilt or responsibility 
expanded to include any actions that could be construed as support for or compliance 
with the Nazi administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  The Germans 
were, in effect, collectively responsible for the actions of Nazi Germany.50 
Following the destruction of Lidice, even the most skeptical among the Allied 
Leaders began to approve of Benes’ plans to pursue “humane” population transfers.  
When the Allies raised any questions about the expulsions’ humanitarian implications or 
legalities, Benes would hammer upon the legality and humanitarian implications of the 
destruction of Lidice.  Even more important for the Benes government was the outcry 
expressed in the American and British Press over the massacre.  The New York Times 
and the Economist ran multiple accounts of the incident that swayed public opinion in 
favor of the Benes Government.  Suddenly, for many in the European Theatre of War, 
“Remember Lidice” became a rallying cry that mirrored its American counterpart 
“Remember Pearl Harbor.”51 
Leadership within the Labour Party led British Government, as well as leaders 
within other Allied governments responded to Benes’ plan to transfer the minority 
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populations from Czechoslovakia with open arms.  Within the party’s plans for postwar 
resettlement, the party planners declared that the end of the Second World War 
presented the Allied governments with a rare opportunity to redraw the ethnic lines of 
Europe that historically lacked definition.  The party platform went so far as to declare 
that “The organised transfer of population in the immediate post-War period, may, 
indeed, be one of the foundations of better international relations in a later phase.  Nor 
would this be a new departure.”  The British parliament and particularly the Labour Party 
members bought into Benes’ claim that the repatriation of Germans throughout Eastern 
Europe was in the best interest of a lasting post-War peace.52 
With international support for Benes’ postwar aims shored up, the Czechoslovak 
Government-in-Exile in London and its communist counterpart in Moscow became 
places of significant contention over the nature of postwar deportation and other 
retributive policies.  Klement Gottwald and his communist allies in Moscow demanded 
harsh punishments for members of the bourgeois elite from all ethnic backgrounds who 
opportunistically collaborated with or at the very least failed to resist the German 
occupational forces.  For the Benes government-in-exile, the primary concern was to 
capture all collaborators, as well as secure the removal of the majority of Germans 
through deportations.  National committees and tribunals would deal with German 
criminals prior to deportation.  Czech collaborators who denounced their neighbors to 
the Nazis, aided or abetted the enemy, or collaborated in the interest of personal gain 
faced investigation, arrest, and trials under the new Czech administration.  Most of them 
would be tried and convicted as traitors as retribution for the destruction of the 
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resistance.  The resistance members who remained demanded their chance for 
vengeance.  No matter the disagreements between Czech nationalists and communist, 
between Benes and Gottwald, they all agreed that those populations and members of 
populations that collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces must pay for their actions 
against the Czechoslovak state.53 
The final necessary measure to ensure that Benes had a relatively free hand in 
dealing with ethnic matters within Czechoslovakia was to secure Joseph Stalin’s 
complete support for the deportations.  Under Masaryk, Benes had been an ardent 
nationalist who was a dyed-in-the-wool anti-communist.  By 1943, however, Benes 
recognized that the Red Army would liberate Czechoslovakia.  The Pragmatic Benes 
traveled to Moscow where he feigned an interest in communism and won over Stalin’s 
support for a reconstituted Czechoslovakia as well as his support for the deportation of 
the Sudetendeutsche.  As the Soviet Red Army rolled westward, and reports of its 
atrocities against the Germans followed in its wake, Benes knew that the Red Army 
would put up little or no resistance to his plans for Czechoslovakia’s Germans.54 
From the time of his resignation following the Munich Conference, Edvard Benes 
faced a future tainted by the stigma of his failure to protect his nation.  The failed 
international attempt to satiate Hitler’s appetite for Lebensraum ultimately left most 
leaders involved, including Chamberlain, to careers of memoir writing.  For Benes, 
however, it meant a redoubled effort to rewrite his past and reestablish himself as the 
uncontested leader of Czechoslovakia.  With his leadership and state reestablished, 
Benes set out to create the political capital necessary to secure allied support for his 
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postwar plans for Czechoslovakia.  In ordering the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, 
Benes set the wheels into motion that would deliver Allied support for his planned 
postwar forced transfer of millions of Germans from the former Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia into the postwar confines of Germany.  Benes set the stage not for the next 
step in the Czech German relationship, but rather for the end of the relationship through 
the elimination of one of the participants. 
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The End of the War 
The Wild Times 
 As early as the 1942 signing of the Saint James Declaration, Benes began a 
radio propaganda campaign designed to ignite the simmering embers of Czech-German 
hatred in the Protectorate.  Benes incited the civilian populations of Czechoslovakia to 
seek out their own vigilante justice against collaborators and traitors.  This did very little 
to rouse the resistance of the Czechs for most of the war, but the arrival of the Red 
Army in 1945 changed the scene.  As the rigid, extra-legal structures of the Protectorate 
of Bohemia and Moravia disappeared when the Red Army rolled through the area; a 
political vacuum emerged in its wake leaving little to govern the actions of the liberated 
populations.  In anticipation of the liberation, Benes planned his return to 
Czechoslovakia by way of Moscow. 
 In early April 1945, the principle leaders of the Czech Nationalist and Czech 
Communist resistance groups met in the liberated city of Kaschau to establish 
temporary political and legal structures to take hold in the wake of the Red Army’s 
advance.  Though Klement Gottwald and Edvard Benes were not present, each leader 
forwarded his agenda to the meeting in order to ensure his own influence over the 
liberated territories of Czechoslovakia.  Both the nationalists and the communists 
agreed in principle to a program that would govern the liberated territories until a 
provisional government could meet to prepare for the reestablishment of a permanent 
Czechoslovak government.  The directives issued in Kaschau pertained to the creation 
of a Czechoslovak military force from units that were already attached to the Soviet Red 
Amy, recognition of the Soviet Red Army’s role in the liberation of the Czechoslovak 
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state, and the treatment and punishment of collaborators as well as the Volksdeutsche 
and Magyar minorities.55   
 The Kaschau Program of April 5, 1945 created an interim national government 
for the territories of Czechoslovakia freed by the Red Army.  In Section V of the 
program, the representatives of the first cabinet council established a new system of 
government by popularly elected national committees.  However, the section only 
declared that there would be popular non-partisan elections without any direction as to 
how these elections would be organized.  The program empowered these national 
committees to supervise and administer their geographical regions with only nominal 
supervision provided by the national government that President Edvard Benes directed 
by decree.  The cabinet focused the power of the state mainly in the local national 
committees as authorized by the President.  The cabinet directed the national 
committees to secure the capture of any individual believed to have collaborated in 
some manner with the Nazi occupying forces.  The program did not provide a litmus test 
for national loyalty, so each committee created its own criteria for demonstrated loyalty 
to Czechoslovakia or traitorous actions on behalf of the Nazi Third Reich.  Ultimately, 
the wide range of interpretation of these laws led many national committees to convict 
individuals of collaboration based partly, if not predominantly, on ethnicity.56 
 Section VIII of the Kaschau Program further invoked ethnically motivated criteria.  
The section began with a declaration of solidarity amongst all Czechoslovaks for their 
suffering at the hands of citizens (German, Slovak, Czech, and Magyar) who 
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collaborated with the Nazi Occupation forces.  Then, this section of the program 
peculiarly declared that, “The Republic has no wish to persecute its loyal German and 
Magyar citizens, and they, and above all those who proved their faithfulness even in 
times of great difficulty, will be unaffected.”  However, the program went on to define 
citizenship for the minorities of Czechoslovakia by singling out Germans and Magyars.   
Czechoslovak citizenship for Germans and Magyars who held it before Munich 
1938 will be confirmed and the possibility of their return to the Republic will be 
assured only if they were anti-Nazis and anti-Fascists, if they fought against 
Henlein and the irredentist Magyar parties for the Czechoslovak Republic in the 
period before Munich and if, after 15 March, they were persecuted for their 
resistance, their struggle against the regime then in power and their loyalty to the 
Republic by the German and Magyar official authorities, were thrown into prisons 
and concentration camps or had to flee abroad from the German or Magyar 
terror, where they actively participated in the struggle for the restoration of 
Czechoslovakia. 
 Czechoslovak citizenship of other Czechoslovak citizens of German or 
Magyar nationality will be cancelled.  Although they may again opt for 
Czechoslovakia, public authorities will retain the right of individual decision in the 
case of each application.  Those Germans and Magyars who have been 
prosecuted and condemned for a crime against the Republic and the Czech and 
Slovak people will be declared to have forfeited their Czechoslovak citizenship 
and, unless they are under sentence of death, will be expelled from the Republic 
for ever. 
 Germans and Magyars who immigrated into Czechoslovak territory after 
Munich, 1938, will, unless liable to criminal proceedings be forthwith expelled 
from the Republic, with the exception of those who worked on behalf of 
Czechoslovakia.57 
 
Sections VIII, IX and X of the Kaschau Program made it very clear to the national 
committees that only “loyal” members of these minorities would be permitted to remain 
in postwar Czechoslovakia.  Once again, the vagueness of the law led to a simple 
question, how could an ethnic German or Magyar prove his or her loyalty?  Moreover, in 
this and other government documents created immediately following the liberation, 
there are mentions of loyal Germans, and yet for the most part in practice being 
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German was equated with being a collaborator.  In the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia, the question of citizenship became one of historical and scientific proof of 
one’s lineage and genetic purity.  To make this identification easier, Reinhard Heydrich 
had established a complex system of Reich passports to indicate the social and racial 
status of an individual.  In the Benes’ postwar Czechoslovakia, Germans and their 
Magyar counterparts faced an even more significant challenge, proving through 
evidence provided by neighbors and family members that an individual did nothing to 
support or even merely approve of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia or the 
Hungarian occupation authorities in their zone carved out of prewar Czechoslovakia.  
The message to the national committees from Benes and Gottwald remained clear.  
The presence of Germans and Magyars destabilized the region prior to the war, so in 
the interest of peace they needed to be forced out of postwar Czechoslovakia.58  
As Benes’s and Gottwald’s representatives met to create an immediate postwar 
government, in regions throughout the Czechoslovak state, retribution against 
Germans, whether they had collaborated with the Third Reich or not, began in earnest.  
Reports from across eastern and central Europe recorded the ferocious assault of the 
Soviet Red Army as well as that of the newly liberated populations on ethnic Germans.  
The Soviets raped, plundered and pillaged as they drove back the Wehrmacht 
terrorizing the Volksdeutsche as they went.  One German farmer’s wife in Seiferdorf 
gained an immediate appreciation for the nightmare that liberation brought for the 
German minority in Czechoslovakia. 
A very restless time began for us on 5 May 1945, when the Russians occupied 
our region.  Right on the first evening, our nieces who lived with my mother-in-
law as refugees in the annex of the farm, came running breathlessly and begged 
                                                     
58 “The Kaschau Programme,” in Schieder, 184-187. 
Taylor 48 
 
 
us to hide them as otherwise they would be raped by the Russians.  That was 
only the beginning.  Very few young girls were to be seen after this.  They hid 
wherever possible; no woman was safe from the Russians, not even older 
ones.59 
 
The Soviets were not the only source of  fear as the Wehrmacht retreated.  The 
Czech resistance began its own campaign of vengeance against the Germans that were 
left behind.  Individuals seeking to settle their own scores with neighbors and 
collaborators prowled the liberated streets armed with sticks, rocks, pistols, and rifles.  
Men, who sought revenge against any German they could find, would pose as officers 
of the law, shoot those who resisted, and arrested many based entirely upon their 
identification as German.  The Kaschau Program’s national committees became 
vigilante committees made up of members of the resistance, who established summary 
courts that meted out retribution at alarming rates.  Germans, regardless of their actions 
during the Nazi occupation, were charged with collaboration, generally on the biased 
testimony of some wronged neighbor.  If a sentence of capital punishment was 
pronounced, the prisoner would be shot later that same day.  Due to the influx of 
charged individuals, the national committees’ courts established impromptu prisons in 
homes, former ghettos, and concentration camps to hold the prisoners.  In these camps, 
guards coerced confessions from the prisoners through torture, and put them to death 
before they could be tried in court. 
Apart from the drinking bouts, the guards’ orgies with interned women, and the 
torture during interrogations, there were regular executions.  Some guards even 
invited their friends to watch.  After attempts to kill by 220-volt electric current did 
not succeed, death was by hanging…Everyone who was to be executed was first 
tortured until he signed the confession he was given.60 
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Officially, the national committees sought to reuse the Nazi-created concentration 
camps as prisons and collection points for minority Germans and those accused of 
collaboration.  Due to the desperation of the national committees for guards in these 
reassigned concentration camps, former concentration camp internees often performed 
this duty, which gave them an opportunity for revenge.  The conditions within these 
“prisons,” and the acts of debauchery committed within, made imprisonment a most 
dreaded fate.  One of the most infamous camps staffed first by the Nazis and then by 
the Czechs was Theresienstadt, which became a prison for notorious former members 
of the SS and Waffen SS.  Some zealous Czech nationals did away with all pretense of 
legality, rounded up all the Germans from the surrounding area, and placed them in 
impromptu prisons created from barns, garages, and industrial plants.  For one young 
German girl who attempted to escape from the hands of the Soviets, but was captured 
by her Czech neighbors, the nightmare of imprisonment took the following form: 
Once there [on a large Czech estate], we were arrested and locked into storage 
sheds, treated and guarded like hardened criminals.  90% of the people were 
elderly, women and children…”Food” was available in pig troughs.  Whoever 
sought to collect something edible while out in the fields [working] was 
immediately shot…Night after night we were handed over to the Russians—What 
they did to us was indescribable!61 
 
Under the guise of capturing traitors and collaborators, some Czech national 
committees concentrated the German population present in their jurisdiction in 
preparation for their deportation.  Just as the Nazi Third Reich provided Jews, Roma, 
and others with careful documentation of orders to vacate their homes for the purpose 
of relocation, and ultimately, the legal confiscation of all of their property by the state, 
the Czechoslovak national committees did much the same. During the chaos in the 
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aftermath of liberation, the Czech national committees served thousands of Germans 
with legal documentation demanding that they immediately vacate the premises in 
preparation for transportation to Germany.  The orders were succinct in June of 1945: 
You and your whole family are required to be ready before 10 a.m., 18 June 
1945, to depart from the territory of the CSR.  Each person may take with him a 
maximum weight of 30 kilograms of luggage.  The summons for departure will 
follow tomorrow and before this summons arrives, you may not leave your 
residence. 
 I draw your attention to the fact that any damage, destruction, etc. of the 
property and installations of your household could even be punished by death.  
This expatriation is taking place in complete agreement with Russian Army 
Headquarters.  The persons concerned are to assemble in Habartice in front of 
Kretscham Restaurant at 11 a.m.62 
 
By July of 1945, the national committees refined their orders for expulsion by 
itemizing the items that the committee permitted Germans to carry with them to the 
occupied zones of Germany.  While this itemized list appeared to allow the Germans to 
keep much of their personal belongings in their possession, the truth was that the 
majority of the items would be confiscated or stolen before arrival in the German 
occupied zones.  The precision that characterized these orders were eerily reminiscent 
of those issued during the German occupation.63 
Notice 
Mr. Leopold Pfitzner and all members of his family 
Landskron, Schillerstraᵦe 506 
 
In accordance with the resolution passed by the Administrative Commission of 
the town of Landkron [National Committee], you are required to be present in the 
Market Place at 7 a.m., 5 July 1945, for the purpose of being expelled from the 
Czechoslovak Republic. 
 
For this purpose you may take the following articles with you: 
1. Food, as much as you can carry, at least 7 days (sic) supply; 
                                                     
62 “Okresni spravni komise ve Frydlante v. C.” 15 June 1945, as translated in Schieder, 309. 
 
 
Taylor 51 
 
 
2. Clothing (the bare necessities); 
3. Washing materials (soap, toothpaste and toothbrush, etc.); 
4. Underwear, children’s underwear, bedding; 
5. Money, securities, deposit books, etc.; 
6. Jewelry; 
7. Perambulator 
You are further allowed to take a hand-barrow with you for transport. 
You have to leave your residence in perfect order.  Non-Compliance with this 
notice will be punished. 
There is no appeal against this notice64 
 
As the committees’ continued the concentration of the Germans in 
Czechoslovakia, they also began to consider the methods necessary to transport the 
expellees to the German border.  This conundrum was created by the aftermath of the 
war.  Allied bombing and other military operations left many of the bridges, roads, and 
railroads that connected Czechoslovakia and Germany non-traversable.  The 
concentration camps, or deportation camps, quickly reached their maximum capacity 
and continued to grow.  This led many of the committees to endorse forced marches to 
the German border in order to expel the Germans that were currently incarcerated as 
well as those given orders to vacate.  These marches, of men, women, children, and the 
elderly resulted in the deaths of thousands.  While sources disagree over the number 
and severity of these marches, they devastated the individuals who experienced them.   
Here is a description of one such instance:   
At 5 a.m. on 13 May, the marching order was given.  A few carriages were 
available for old and sick persons and for babies, but not by any means enough 
to transport all those who were in need.  As it was, the camp had been mainly 
filled with women and children and old people….It was terribly hot, the original 
closed marching column got more and more drawn out, some old and sick 
persons had to rest more and more often until they could not get any further.  
Many of them died in the ditches either from exhaustion or simply killed by the 
accompanying Revolutionary Guard [Czech Guards]…. 
…On the way Russians came and selected what they liked:  suitcases, 
bags and whatever was left, and most of all—women.  Between 2 a.m. and 5 
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a.m., we were allowed to rest in the ditches along the road, but we found no 
peace.  Then we went to Konigsaal (Zbraslav), where the harassed people were 
assembled in a large meadow.  I was told by a member of the Polish Red Cross, 
who served amongst the Czech guards, that of some 1,300 people who had 
started on this march from Pribram, some 300 had not survived it.65 
 
The Kaschau Program provided the national committees with far-reaching 
interpretive powers to determine what actions constituted collaboration with the Nazi 
occupation forces and the administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  
For most of the committees, identification of an individual as Sudetendeutsche or that 
person’s failure to demonstrate any participation in resistance activities resulted in 
expulsion or imprisonment.  The preponderance of evidence presented in the courts 
created by the national committees most often took the form of unreliable eyewitness 
testimony.  While the testimony of a fellow Czech patriot on multiple occasions resulted 
in acquittal, more often than not it provided Czechs with the opportunity to denounce 
neighbors based upon selfish quarrels, greed, or jealousy.  Just as the Nazi occupation 
forces became entangled in petty local rivalries, the national committees became an 
instrument with which individuals could mete out their personal forms of vengeance.  
For President Edvard Benes, the international community began to exert greater 
pressure to limit action in the liberated territories to the capture and punishment of 
proven Nazi collaborators.66 
The Great Decree 
 In an attempt to “reign in” and focus the unbridled retribution of the national 
committees, President Edvard Benes issued the Great Decree on June 19, 1945 to 
provide central government direction to the local national committees.  The Great 
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Decree established the legal definitions for indictments of individuals based upon the 
specific circumstances of their accused crimes.  It also established a network of national 
criminal courts to try anyone accused of the crimes outlined within the decree.  Benes 
originally meant for the great decree to govern Czechoslovak legal precedent for three 
months, it ultimately remained in force for the next two years.67 
 The preamble to the Great Decree declared the intentions of the Czechoslovak 
government in its pursuance of “justice”.  From its outset, the Great Decree 
demonstrated that the pursuit of justice was, in fact, the exercise of retribution against 
anyone perceived to have participated in or cooperated with the Protectorate 
administration.  The nature of the document was not to provide fair and impartial justice 
but rather a justice inspired by and pursuant to vengeance. 
The Shocking crimes committed by the Nazis and their treasonous accomplices 
in Czechoslovakia call for stern justice.  The oppression of the homeland and the 
murder, enslavement, robbery, and humiliation to which the Czechoslovak 
people were subjected, and all of the extreme German barbarities, in which, 
regrettably, traitorous Czecholovak citizens also took part (including some who 
abused their high office, mandate, or rank), must be punished without delay in 
order to eradicate completely the Nazi and Fascist evil…68 
 
 The Great Decree established four general categories for crimes committed 
during the “period of heightened danger to the Republic”.  The first and most serious 
charge under the provisions of the decree was crimes committed against the state.  
Crimes against the state involved any perpetration of action that involved the 
commission of treason, violence against state authorities, the active participation in or 
assistance with the Nazi invasion and subsequent subjugation of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, all of which constituted capital offenses.  Public expression of approval or 
                                                     
67 Douglas, 47. 
68 “The Great Decree,” as reproduced in Frommer, 348. 
Taylor 54 
 
 
general support for the Nazi occupation also constituted a capital offense and was 
punishable with death.  Anyone in Czechoslovakia, who was a member of the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nazi Party) or the Sudetendeutsche 
Partei (SdP), faced a prison sentence of not less than five and no more than twenty 
years.  The first chapter of the Great Decree further defined crimes against the state as 
any action committed abroad which detracted from or acted in opposition to the goals of 
the Czechoslovak state.  In essence, failure to support the Czechoslovak state during 
the time of “heightened danger” would be severely punished.69 
 The second general category defined by the Great Decree was “Crimes Against 
Persons.”  This category of crimes was comprised of the traditional crimes of murder, 
public violence, enslavement, and manslaughter.  Anyone convicted of these major 
crimes against individuals faced capital punishment, which was the only penalty 
prescribed by the law.  Lesser versions of these crimes required imprisonment for ten to 
twenty years for each infraction of the law.  Within the “Crimes Against Persons,” 
section of the Great Decree, Benes’ attempted to ensure that the legal indictments and 
punishments created at the end of Second Word War followed the prewar legal 
precedents established during the First Republic prior to the Munich Conference.  The 
definitions for acts of murder, public violence, enslavement, and manslaughter were 
referenced within the penal codes of the First Republic.  Another glaring example of the 
subjective, retributive nature of the Great Decree is the ever-present statement that in 
cases of extreme or egregious action committed by the accused, conviction could result 
in the administration of the death penalty by the courts.70 
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 The third general category of crimes as defined by the Great Decree was 
“Crimes Against Property.”  These crimes were the traditional crimes of robbery, willfully 
damaging another’s property, and arson.  Egregious violations of these laws resulted in 
the administration of capital punishment; others would be sentenced to ten to twenty 
years in prison.  Participation in the confiscation of property that belonged to other 
Czechoslovak citizens, including Jews, constituted at the minimum a secondary 
violation of these laws resulting in punishment of twenty years to life.  In the first three 
sections of the Great Decree, one finds the classical liberal themes of rights to life, 
freedom, and property.  Crimes against these basic human rights were of first concern 
to the Benes government in the aftermath of liberation.71 
 The fourth general category of crime demonstrates the clear motivation behind 
the Great Decree.  The proclamation was not only an attempt to unify and clarify the 
legal jurisdiction and punishments administered by the special courts and national 
committees; its ultimate goal was to provide an opportunity for retribution against 
anyone considered a collaborator.  For many, the cruelest act committed during the 
German occupation were denunciations in which individuals informed on their 
neighbors, friends, and family members to the occupying forces for real, perceived, or 
false accusations of subversive activities.  This was the most clear and concise 
punishment pronounced within the Great Decree: 
Whoever, during the period of heightened danger to the Republic in the service 
or interest of the enemy, or by exploiting the situation created by the enemy 
occupation, denounced another for some real or invented activity, shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five to ten years.  If, however, the 
denouncer caused the loss of liberty of a Czechoslovak citizen through his 
denunciation, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten to twenty 
years.  If the denunciation resulted, either directly or indirectly, in the loss of 
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freedom of a larger number of persons or in grievous harm to health, he shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment for life, and if his denunciation resulted in someone’s 
death, he shall be punished by a sentence of death.72 
 
The latter portion of the Great Decree sought to establish the Extraordinary 
People’s Courts as the judicial component of the national committees.  While Benes and 
his cabinet endeavored to assure Western observers that all care was taken to ensure 
the preservation of classical liberal ideals in the formation and operation of these special 
courts, in practice these courts failed to uphold them.  National committees selected the 
judges appointed to the Extraordinary People’s Court and Benes confirmed them.  The 
Great Decree further established lesser Extraordinary People’s Courts attached to the 
national committees that acted under the same premises of the Extraordinary People’s 
Courts.  Essentially, the People’s Court System appeared to mimic similar court 
systems established in liberated France.  However, within this system there was no 
chance of appeal, no judicial review, and ultimately no chance to overturn a verdict.  
However, one of the most glaring examples of the retributive nature of the Great Decree 
came in the form of its proscribed legal implementation of capital punishment, which 
required the sentence to be carried out within two hours of the pronounced verdict or, at 
the request of the convicted, within three hours.  There was no time to apply for 
clemency, or for the authorities to ensure the rights of the accused; there was only time 
for the execution.  In an even more spectacular example of the politics of vengeance, in 
extraordinary capital cases, the punishment could be postponed up to twenty-four hours 
so that the public could be gathered to watch the event: 
(3) The Extraordinary People’s Court may also rule that the death penalty is to be 
carried out in public.  Such a decision should be rendered in particular in cases in 
which the savage nature of the crime, the degenerate character of the 
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perpetrator, the number of his crimes, or his rank call for the public execution of 
the verdict.  to ensure the public nature of the execution, in such a case the court 
may extend the two hour time-limit, but not beyond twenty-four hours.73 
 
On the surface, the Great Decree appeared to be a magnanimous attempt by the 
Benes’ government to reign in the “wild times” of the aftermath of liberation.  The 
criminal offences described clearly target those who violated the human rights of others 
in Czechoslovakia.  Only upon closer examination of the legal implications of the decree 
does its true retributive tone and motivation become apparent.  The law provided little, if 
any, definition of evidentiary standards.  Furthermore, it lacked any viable possibility of 
appeal making the final declaration of the given Extraordinary People’s Courts was 
absolute, and the law required the execution of punishment, specifically capital 
punishment within two hours of the pronouncement of sentence.  The Great Decree did 
little to establish the rule of law and order within liberated Czechoslovakia, but rather 
created state sponsored retributive justice as meted out by ad hoc courts attached to 
national committees staffed with vengeance-minded Czech nationalists and 
communists.  The nightmare of retribution and vigilante as inspired by and covered by 
the legal guise of the Great Decree, ever-larger groups perceived to have collaborated 
with the Nazi occupation forces.  In other words, common German ethnicity became 
enough evidence to convict an individual of collaboration. 
The Benes Legislative Agenda 
 In addition to the Great Decree, Edvard Benes issued several lesser decrees 
designed to appropriate German property and further incite local deportations and acts 
of violence against minority Germans and collaborators.  However, unlike the façade of 
ethnic blindness espoused within the Great Decree, these laws created built in ethnic 
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hostilities.  Due to the actions of the Nazi Germans during the occupation, and the 
subsequent destruction of property caused by the wars waged with and against the Nazi 
Third Reich, Germans were obliged to forfeit their claim to the estates and land of 
Czechoslovak soil that would then be redistributed to Czech peasants.  The Land 
reform law of 1945 began: 
In order to meet the call of Czech and Slovak peasants and landless persons for 
a new and really effective land reform and impelled above all by the desire to 
take Czech and Slovak soil out of the hands of the alien German and Magyar 
estate owners and also out of the hands of traitors to the Republic and to give it 
into the hands of the Czech and Slovak peasantry and landless persons, I decree 
on the proposal of the Government…74 
 
However, Benes wanted the Germans to pay the bill for the chaos and 
destruction that they caused.  The Czechs needed significant amounts of labor in order 
to repair the destroyed infrastructures of industry and transportation.  In a way to 
provide both a punishment to the Germans and supply Czechoslovak industry with the 
cheap-labor necessary to rebuild, the state conscripted thousands of Germans who sat 
in state custody.   
For the purpose of removing and making good the damage cause by the war and 
the air raids and also of restoring the economy disrupted by the war, compulsory 
labor shall be introduced for persons who, in accordance with the terms of the 
constitutional decree of the President of the Republic of August 2, 1945, Sb. No. 
33, concerning the rules governing Czechoslovak citizenship of persons of 
German or Magyar nationality, have lost their Czechoslovak citizenship.  
Compulsory labor shall also extend to persons of Czech, Slovak, or other Slav 
nationalities who, in the period of increased danger to the Republic, sought leave 
to become German or Magyar citizens without being obliged to do so by 
compulsion or by special circumstances.75 
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The Benes government that once condemned the actions of the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia, particularly its forced labor policies and property confiscation 
policies, utilized eerily similarly worded and executed laws against postwar 
Czechoslovakia’s German minority.  These laws failed to present even the façade of 
equality under the law for Germans and Czechs and, in essence, indicted the German 
population entirely as collaborators responsible for the chaos and destruction of the 
Second World War.   No longer were these laws solely aimed at individuals responsible 
for the perpetration of collaborative efforts.  Individuals could now be convicted based 
entirely upon their ethnic affiliation. 
The Continued Wild Times 
 The Great Decree issued by President Edvard Benes sought to standardize and 
legalize retributive acts conducted under the administration of the national committees.  
The national committees approved countless acts that denied basic human rights to 
those who were deemed guilty of collaboration; however, they also approved acts of the 
same nature against civilians who were only guilty of having German ethnicity.  The 
issuance of the Great Decree did not inherently insure the compliance of the national 
committees.  Within the majority of the national committees, the push and desire for 
retribution against collaborators and minority Germans trumped any professed desire 
for a semblance of impartial justice.  The national committees continued with the forced 
deportations of thousands of minority Germans to occupied Austria and Germany.  
Because the new Czechoslovakia lacked the stability necessary to repair many of the 
damaged rail lines and railroads, the forced marches of Germans continued.  Where rail 
lines were functioning, the cattle cars, which once carried Jews, Roma, homosexuals 
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and others, were now transporting nearly two thousand Germans into Austria and the 
occupied zones of Germany per day.76 
In practice within the jurisdiction of the national committees, the Great Decree 
served as an inspiration for additional charges to be filed against “accused” 
collaborators and innocent minority Germans.  Ultimately, the national committees 
either partially followed the decree or completely ignored it.  One Czech national 
committee member when asked about his committee’s compliance with the decree 
declared that the committee had never received the written decree and were operating 
under the rules of the Kaschau Program.  In June and July of 1945, the demonstration 
of the retributive motivation behind the actions of some of the national committees 
became apparent.  According to a report filed by a former official within the Czech 
Administrative Commission (National Committee) in Aussig, the arrests and 
deportations were not occurring fast enough: 
The local national committees were given the task to compile a register of all 
persons of German nationality who were members of the Nazi Party, in 
preparation of their removal.  Lists were compiled into the late hours of the night.  
In the early hours of the morning, military units made up of the Revolutionary 
Guard and of so-called guerillas, arrived in the affected districts.  When members 
of the local National Committee asked them to evacuate the Germans in 
accordance with the compiled lists, they received very rude answers from the 
generally drunk “officers”—“you can put these lists up your…” 
They went into action.  They entered flats and every family was told to report 
within half an hour at the assembly point of the district.  Jewelry was confiscated, 
and to make quite sure that nothing was hidden there, girls had even their 
genitals searched.  Then the “transports” were loaded into tramcars and taken to 
Tellnitz, from where they had to walk over the Erzgebirge to Germany…77 
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The criterion of ethnicity, as practiced by the Czechs in power, became enlarged 
by the decree, which opened the door to question the loyalty of all, especially those who 
were of different ethnic heritage, the Sudetendeutsche and Volksdeutsche.  Charges of 
collaboration, murder, and slavery incited further acts of violence against the German 
minority as reprisal for other crimes that were committed during the Nazi occupation.  
National committees throughout Czechoslovakia created ethnically specific provisions in 
order to identify more easily the Germans who posed a threat to postwar Czechoslovak 
society.  The Czechs repurposed many of the practices utilized by the Nazis in their 
administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  Many of the national 
committees required Germans to wear armbands and insignias to identify their affiliation 
during and after the war.  The tensions reached critical mass at the end of July 1945, as 
evidenced once again in Aussig.  An accidental explosion rocked the Schonpriesen 
Sugar Processing Plant, which the surrounding Czech population took to be an act of 
German sabotage or terrorism: 
The first explosion occurred at 3.45 p.m. on 31 July 1945, shattering all windows 
within a radius of 3 kilometres.  Nobody in the town had the slightest inkling at 
that moment that this was to be the signal for murder.  Soldiers surrounded the 
bridge over the Elbe, and when Communist provocateurs arrived at 4.10 p.m., 
accompanied by people in Russian uniforms, the “executions” started.  Germans 
returning from work and wearing their white armlets, became the first victims on 
the Benes Bridge.  The soldiers had been asked by Mr. Vondra, the chairman of 
the local National Committee of Aussig/Elbe, to avoid any massacre; but they did 
not obey his order and joined in the murder.  A mother wheeling her child in a 
pram across the bridge was killed with sticks and, together with the child, thrown 
over the railings into the Elbe whilst submachine guns fired at her.78 
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Reports of the forced marches and atrocities traveled up the chains of command 
to the British, American, and Soviet commanders.  These accounts recorded the bloody 
violence, rape, pillage and plunder suffered by the Germans as the national committees 
began the process of deportation.  Harrowing tales of individual loss and misery 
stunned the American forces in Austria.  The American liaison officer for the expulsions 
in Prague, Colonel John Fye, reported that Czech leaders, in charge of the 
deportations, deliberately ignored the warnings issued by the Allied administration of the 
deportations.    He also found that there were “flagrant violations of the transfer 
agreement” occurring, and that there were “deliberate attempts to deceive the American 
authorities and threats to the expellees by the commissioners of certain districts if they 
complained while in Czechoslovakia.  When Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, ordered the military to prohibit the entrance of any deportees into Austrian 
territory, the Czechs forced the Germans into a no man’s land of improvised camps.  
For the Americans stationed on the border it was their first exposure to the cruelty of the 
deportation.  With little food or sanitation, outbreaks of typhus and dysentery were 
rampant.  There were several reports of American soldiers intervening on behalf of the 
deportees.  The leadership of the British, American and even Soviet contingents began 
to consider alternatives to the wild deportations that were occurring in Czechoslovakia.79 
The Potsdam Agreement 
 The Potsdam Conference was the final summit of the Grand Alliance of the 
Second World War.  The unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in hand, the Allied 
leadership continued the process of redrawing the map of Europe.  Thirty years earlier 
the victorious Allied leadership gathered in Paris for the same reason, but its outcomes 
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were ultimately disastrous for all the nations and states involved.  For most of the men 
gathered in Potsdam from the West, the lesson of Paris 1919 was that a weak Germany 
was not in the interest of a lasting peace.  The Americans and British came to the 
peace-negotiating table in search of a secure Western Europe and the creation of a 
United Nations.  The Soviets came to the table to secure their sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe.  Most of the contentious points in the negotiations centered on the 
exact location Oder-Neisse line that marked the eastern boundary of the reconstituted 
Poland.80 
 However, a point of contention that slowly festered in the deliberations was the 
growing humanitarian crisis created by the deportation of Germans from Eastern 
Europe.  Even if each government provisionally approved of partial deportations, their 
first concern was to ensure that war criminals could not escape prosecution through 
deportation to the German occupation zones.  In March, April, and May 1945 alone, the 
Soviets authorized the deportation of more than three million Germans to occupied 
Germany.  The British, Americans and Soviets recognized the looming humanitarian 
crisis would only grow worse with the approach of winter.  The thousands of expellees 
from the east entered a decimated Germany.  Allied bombing campaigns and other war 
related damage had destroyed the infrastructure necessary to house and feed the huge 
influx of population.  In the summer, the lack of sanitation would prove troublesome 
enough, in the winter the growing death tolls would become exponential due to 
exposure and lack of resources, particularly food.  Reports from military commanders 
showed the growing problems that would most certainly influence public opinion in the 
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West.  Article XIII of the initial Potsdam Agreement authorized the “orderly and humane” 
deportation of Sudetendeutsche and Volksdeutsche from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
the Soviet Union.  When the numbers of the deportations quickly overwhelmed Allied 
military personnel in the occupation zones, the allies ordered an immediate halt to the 
deportations.81 
 Even with the ordered moratorium on the expulsions, the forced deportations and 
criminal trials continued.  The Allies permitted the expulsions to resume at a decreased 
rate of six to eight thousand ethnic Germans per day, a number that continued to stretch 
the already depleted resources in occupied Germany.  The administrations in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union repaired the rail lines and railroads, 
which streamlined the deportation process.  Illegally expelled Volksdeutsche from 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania significantly increased the number of deportees 
received from Czechoslovakia.  Multiple checkpoints on the border reported that 
multiple cattle cars backed with “Germans” bound for Germany contained ethnic 
Germans from the Balkans.  Many of these Germans from the Balkans could not speak 
Czech or German, so communication on these trains proved to be impossible.  Though 
Potsdam required the trains to have enough days’ rations to feed the deportees on 
board, too often the dead and malnourished outnumbered the healthy that disembarked 
the trains.  The moratorium did very little to better the circumstances for those who were 
deported.82 
Additional reports surfaced within the American and British governments that 
were then leaked to the press.  Where the western press once served Benes well, as it 
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published stories that described in detail the atrocities committed at Lidice, it then 
became antagonistic to the Benes regime in the aftermath of the war.  In August of 
1945, the first questions that surrounded the humanity of the deportations appeared in 
the western press.  The Economist evaluated the deportations as a travesty and called 
upon the British government to put a stop to the deportations: 
The Council of Foreign Ministers must put a stop to this appalling tragedy.  The 
wandering millions in this district are practically without food or shelter.  The 
inhabitable parts of the large urban centres were overcrowded before their 
arrival, and the countryside has only limited means of housing them.  The 
inevitable result will be that millions of them will die from hunger and exhaustion.  
The Germans, no doubt have deserved punishment—but not by torture of this 
kind.  If the Poles and the Czechs wish to be rated higher in civilization than the 
Nazis, they will stop the expulsions at once.83 
 
The character of the Benes' government continued to be under assault in the 
British Press.  The following week, The Economist published another article about the 
disputed frontier between Czechoslovakia and Poland, describing the actions of 
Czechoslovakia in its claims for additional territory as sensible, choosing to restore the 
borders that existed prior to Munich.  However, the editorial finished with another clear 
protest, declaring, “Unhappily, the mass expulsions of Germans and Hungarians 
continue.  Mr. Masaryk [the Czech Foreign Minister] said, a propos of anti-Semitism, 
‘We shall never imitate Hitler in anything.’ Unfortunately it is too late for the Czechs to 
make that claim.”  This was a correlation drawn between the packed, expulsion trains 
bound for Germany, and those utilized by the Nazis for the Final Solution.  While this 
sensationalizes the relationship between the expulsions and the Holocaust, the 
contemporary perception drew parallels.84 
                                                     
83 “Mass Expulsions in Eastern Europe,” The Economist, (September 15, 1945) 369. 
84 “A Disputed Frontier,” The Economist, September 22, 1945, 411. 
Taylor 66 
 
 
In October of 1945, the New York Times published an article that stated Britain 
had requested the cooperation of the rest of the Big Four, including France, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, in pressuring Poland and Czechoslovakia to cease in the 
prosecution of expulsion orders.  The article referred to a wire dispatched from London, 
discussing a hearing held in the House of Commons in which members of Parliament 
pleaded with the British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Herbert MacNeil, to apply 
additional pressure to the restored eastern states to halt the deportations.   
Referring to Mr. Stokes’ Plea that a great many people involved were innocent of 
wrong-doing Mr. MacNeil said that he could not accept this.  “They are, I’m 
afraid, Germans and either through their rulers or themselves have visited on the 
Poles, Czechs and Russians, Christians as well as Jews, monstrous cruelties,” 
he said.85 
 
This declaration of Under-Secretary MacNeil provided a significant window into 
the conundrum faced by the administrations of the Allied states.  On the one hand, there 
was a justifiable need to punish the people responsible for humanity’s bloodiest conflict 
and greatest crimes.  However, for many of these leaders, the ghosts of the Versailles 
Peace Conference of 1919 haunted their every action.  At Versailles, the British and 
French lobbied for significant penalties and reparations against the Germans who were 
forced to claim full responsibility for the First World War, a treaty provision that enraged 
many Germans during the Weimer era.  One of the most useful propaganda points 
utilized by Hitler’s National Socialist Party was its continuous agitation for the return of 
Germany to its rightful place as the continental power it had been under the direction of 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.  For many historians, the ascension of Hitler’s Nazi party 
occurred due to the economic and political conditions created by the Versailles Treaty.  
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The Weimar Republic never recovered from the crises of the interwar period and was 
forever tainted by its submission at Versailles.86 
The leadership in Washington, London, and Paris determined that under no 
circumstances would the mistakes of Versailles be replicated at Potsdam and 
throughout the reconstruction period in Europe.  The Americans and British determined 
that hunting the individuals responsible for the war crimes perpetrated by the Nazi Third 
Reich was the top priority.  They would then prosecute them, based on legal charges 
presented before an international military tribunal based in Nuremburg after the war, 
which would provide the justice desired by their respective populations.  This approach 
would then leave the general population of Germany susceptible to liberal democratic 
influence, and would not drive Germans into the communist fold.  For the Germans of 
Eastern Europe, there was hope; however, it was only a glimmer as the “orderly and 
humane” deportations continued.87 
As late as 1947, the deportations continued from Eastern Europe.  The flow of 
expellees from Czechoslovakia slowed because nearly two million had already been 
deported between May of 1945 and May of 1946.  Less than four months into the 
deportations, the Soviets declared the eastern occupation zone of Germany to be at 
capacity and forced all further expellees to be sent to the British and American zones.  
The British and Americans faced insurmountable shortages in all major provisions and 
space in which to settle the millions of expellees.  In November of 1945, New York 
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Times reporter Sydney Gruson reported that the death of thousands of “ill-clothed, ill-fed 
refugees from these regions [Poland and Czechoslovakia]”.88 
The organized expulsions from Czechoslovakia failed to settle the tensions 
between Czechs and Germans, as was visible along the Czech border with Austria and 
the occupied zones of Germany.  The large numbers of unsettled, starving, angry 
refugees became more and more restless.  In a report to The New York Times, John 
McCormac reported that Sudeten Germans were forming armed gangs and launching 
forays back across the Czech border, terrorizing the Czechs of the Sudetenland.  These 
raids continued until the Czechs ordered military border patrols to stop them.  However, 
these raids provided the Czechoslovak government with fodder to continue the 
deportations in the interest of peace.89 
International pressures to stop the deportations increased continually and when 
these pressures reached critical mass, the expulsions ended.  However, the time that 
was necessary to build up the international pressures was just enough for the Benes 
government to remove the bulk of the minority German population, leaving an 
insignificant few thousand behind.  Czechoslovakia, once the mythological model of a 
democratic state that provided minorities with equal rights, now became a homogenous 
ethnic state in its Czech and Slovak parts.  From this point on, there was no paradigm of 
Czech-German relations, no tenuous coexistence, only the memory of what each group 
inflicted upon the other. 
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Conclusion 
The Expulsions in Modern Memory 
 The expulsion of the Sudetendeutsche and Volksdeutsche from the 
Czechoslovak Republic continued to haunt the country after the Second World War.  
When the Communists, under Klement Gottwald, took control of the government of 
Czechoslovakia in 1948, they sought to silence the discussion and suppressed the 
collective memory of the deportations.  In Western Germany, research and discussions 
concerning the deportations continued as historians and political activists accumulated 
numerous first hand accounts and other primary sources about the expulsions.  By the 
1960s, the community of German expellees became an important political force within 
Western German politics.  It was not until the 1989 fall of the communist regime in 
Czechoslovakia that discourse about the expulsions restarted in earnest.  The release 
of thousands of documents once held under tight security by the communist regime in 
Czechoslovakia led to new calls for reexamination of one of history’s largest and most 
tragic population transfers.  These reexaminations, and the documents released, 
reawakened the world to the tragedies that befell the German minorities of Eastern 
Europe as the liberated governments stripped them of their citizenship, their identities, 
their property, and for millions, their lives.   
 In the aftermath of the Second World War, Western Europe began to rebuild 
itself rapidly.  By the fifties and sixties, Western Europe experienced renewed 
prosperity, the main motor of which was the economic miracle in West Germany.  In 
repentance for the atrocities and terror unleashed by the Nazi Third Reich, the West 
Germans admitted to and issued apologies for the actions of the Nazi Third Reich.  In 
West Germany, the population of expellees became politically active and formed 
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refugee organizations devoted to the political interests of the German expellees.  They 
demanded reparations and compensation for the victims of expulsions.  While the 
Eastern Bloc nations never met their demands, these groups continued to work 
instrumentally within the West German government shaping policy toward their former 
homelands.   
Throughout the process of remembering these expulsions, there continued to 
exist a constant tension between the narratives of genocidal perpetrators and victim of 
ethnic cleansing.  Historian Robert G. Moeller in his work, War Stories:  The Search for 
a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, carefully examined the impact of 
this struggle.  He dismissed the traditional narrative that accused the Germans of 
“forgetting” the crimes of the Nazi past.  Instead, through his collection of primary 
sources including first-hand accounts, he discovered that for the majority of Germans 
the stigma of perpetrator was far less preferable to the narrative of victimhood.  They 
practiced “selective remembering” according to Moeller.  In other words, they chose to 
remember events that victimized the Germans, events that they contemporarily 
compared directly to the sufferings of Jews during the Holocaust.  This tension still fuels 
debate in modern Germany.90 
The German reunification of 1989 brought forward a new chorus of apologies 
and assistance from the German government for the actions of the Third Reich, as well 
as demands for Eastern governments to apologize for their actions during the 
expulsions.  The expellee political organizations found within Eastern Germany other 
expellees who identified with their cause.  While negotiations between Eastern national 
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leaders and the German leaderships began immediately following the communist 
collapse, the Europeans spent the lion’s share of the 1990s debating responsibility 
versus justification for the expulsions throughout Eastern Europe.  The Germans for 
their part, provided apologies and additional economic assistance for post-communist 
states that helped pave the way for a more united European continent, and made 
further reconciliation possible.91 
 In 1997, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Czech President Václav Havel 
worked tirelessly to create a document in which each nation admitted to and apologized 
for his nation’s actions toward the other.  While the document was signed and ratified, it 
did very little to soothe the tensions that still existed between Czechs, who felt 
victimized at Munich in 1938 and during the Nazi occupation, and Germans, who felt 
victimized in the aftermath of the war during the mass expulsions from the East.  
Though international communication and cooperation seemed in the best interest for 
both nations, tensions created by a contested past only escalated as the Czech 
Republic began the process of gaining access to, and membership in, the European 
Union at the turn of the twenty first century.92 
Prior to 1989, the European Union consisted entirely of the nations of Western 
Europe in an economic and political community.  The fall of the Soviet Union created a 
security and economic vacuum in Eastern Europe that led many of its nations to seek 
admittance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.  The 
political separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in January 1993 was 
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accompanied by increasing popular desire, especially among Czechs, to enter into the 
European Union.  However, many refugee and expellee activist groups in Germany 
demanded that Czech admittance to the European Union be tied to a renunciation and 
repeal of the postwar laws of retribution.  However, the British Lord Kingsland, British 
Minister for Legal Affairs, declared to the British Government that the Benes Decrees 
placed no impediment in the path of Czech membership in the European Union.93  In a 
report from the Centre for European Reform in 2002, the European Commission 
declared that the laws were not an obstacle to the admission of the Czech Republic to 
the European Union: 
The European Commission holds that the Benes decrees are not an obstacle to 
Czech or Slovak accession, although the European Parliament’s views are more 
ambivalent. There is no evident legal basis in the EU’s treaties that would allow a 
historical injustice to disqualify a country from membership, but any continuing 
application of the decrees in Czech law would be incompatible with the anti-
discrimination provisions in the treaties. The accession conditions involve criteria 
on democracy, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, but 
they relate to current practice rather than past wrongs. The EU’s focus is on 
encourage [sic] the reconciliation in central Europe.94 
 
Despite the findings of the European Commission, the Benes Decrees still 
elicited continued problems for the accession of the Czech Republic into the European 
Union.  From 2000 to 2007, political opinions among the European Union members 
polarized along support for and against the Czech Republic’s position that their laws 
passed from 1945-1948 did not fall under the purview of the Lisbon Treaty.  According 
to the same Centre for European Reform report, right wing politicians in Austria and 
Germany demanded that the accession be blocked in the interest of justice for the 
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Sudeten Germans.  Then Czech President, Vaclav Klaus, described the Sudeten 
Germans as “Hitler’s Fifth Column” and suggested that they received the punishment 
they deserved.  The Czechs and Slovaks pointed to the finding of the European 
Commission as exonerative of their government.  Nationalist German and Austrian 
Politicians argued that if the expulsions were not a legal roadblock, they were at least 
an ethical one.  When the European Union finally announced the approval of the Czech 
Republic as a member of the European Union, many believed the issue would die 
down.95 
In 2004 and 2005, prior to the accession of the Czech Republic, separate opinion 
polls published in British publications declared that a majority of Czechs supported the 
maintenance of the decrees, while only a small fraction of the population argued for the 
immediate repeal.  In a poll conducted in 2011, four years after the Czech Republic’s 
admittance into the European Union, CzechPosition.com published a political poll in 
which 49% of Czechs favored the preservation of the Benes Decrees a decline of 16% 
from a 2009 poll in which 65% of Czechs favored the maintenance of the laws.  
However, within both polls the percentage of the population that favored the repeal of 
the laws in their entirety remained a minority.  An even more revealing portion of the poll 
asked respondents about their attitude toward the necessity and legality of the forced 
deportations.  That portion of the poll indicated that 42% of Czechs considered the 
expulsion policies fair.  25% said that they were unfair but that actions of the past had a 
statute of limitations.   Seven percent declared that an apology was due, and four 
                                                     
95 Grabble, 2. and Steve Peers, “The Benes Decrees and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights,”  StateWatch.org, University of Essex, (October 12, 2009).  http://www.statewatch.org/ 
news/ 2009/oct/lisbon-benes-decree.pdf. (Accessed:  February 1, 2012) 5-10.   
Taylor 74 
 
 
percent declared that the policies were unfair and that compensation should be paid 
and property restituted to its rightful owners.96 
The long shadow cast by the forced deportations of minority Germans from the 
Czechoslovak republic still haunts the modern Czech government.  Despite the passage 
of over six decades, the Czechs still face tough questions from the expellee 
communities abroad.  In Germany, the group Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen (ZGV—
Center against Expulsions) created museums and archives devoted to the memory of 
the expellees.  These institutions rekindled the debate over the expulsions for a new 
generation of Czechs and Germans.  While the center’s mission statement declares that 
it “was founded in the spirit of reconciliation with all neighboring peoples… [and] with all 
victims of expulsion or genocide,” its efforts have been met with skepticism from Polish 
and Czech leaders. Another group, the Deutsche Weltallianz (DWA—German World 
Alliance) exhaustively formed to search for additional evidence regarding the 
expulsions.  In 2010, the DWA broke a story about the discovery of a mass grave of 
Germans outside the Czech village of Dobronin.  The thirteen Germans were executed 
at the end of the Second World War.  Once again, the memory of the expulsions was 
renewed in both German and Czech National consciences. 97 
 Czechs resolved the issue of Czech-German relations in Bohemia and Moravia 
and eliminated the German presence through deportation.  Now they face questions as 
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to the statutes of limitations on crimes against humanity, and what to do with regimes 
and populations that continue to support laws that led to the expulsion and deaths of 
millions during their transport to their “native” country of origin. In modern Czech 
society, the heinous crimes perpetrated by the Nazis against the populations of 
Bohemia and Moravia warranted the harsh treatment of the Germans under the Benes 
Decrees and Potsdam Agreements.  Despite its clearly ethnic applications, the 
legislation signed into law by Edvard Benes in 1945 continues to hold the status of legal 
precedent in the Czech Republic.98 
The Specter of the Cattle Cars 
 After 1942, millions of people boarded trains with what few possessions they 
were permitted to take, separated from their family and friends, and sent to destinations 
they only vaguely knew or understood.  Under the Nazi Third Reich, these rail lines led 
to concentration camps, forced labor, and ultimately death for the Jews, Roma, and 
others forced onto them.  The cramped, unsanitary conditions and lack of ventilation 
killed many in transit. For those who survived, death waited through overwork, 
malnourishment, exposure, and the gas chambers.  In the aftermath of the Second 
World Ward, trains once again became a tool for redrawing the political, social, cultural, 
and ethnic maps of Europe.  In the interest of a lasting peace, the Allied Powers 
recognized the necessity to move troublesome minority groups to their ethnic 
heartlands.  This operation applied particularly to the millions of Germans in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. 
 In the case of Czechoslovakia, these deportations marked a significant change in 
the history of ethnic relations in Bohemia and Moravia.  Historically, these crown lands 
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had been part of the Habsburg Empire for centuries.  From that time, a complex 
coexistence characterized the relationship between the resident Czechs and Germans.  
The Habsburg Empire’s nationalist liberals attempted to centralize its power in Bohemia 
through state sponsored schools that only taught in German, the requirement that all 
official business conducted in the German language, and the political dominance of 
Germans.  Though these actions were part of a far more complex overhaul of the 
administration of the Habsburg Empire, for Czech nationalists it was an attempt to 
minimize Czech culture and language in favor of the German culture and language.  
The Czechs responded with private Czech schools, local business conducted in Czech, 
and their continued support for the Austrian Emperor in Vienna over the Germans in 
power in the legislature and at the local level.  However, the relations between Czechs 
and Germans cannot be narrowly defined in the terms of conflict or competition, but also 
in cooperation, coexistence, and the intermarriage and transience of identity that existed 
between the two groups.  In essence, there were no solid defining lines between the two 
groups so that participation was not in and of itself exclusionary. 
 The First World War ushered in a change of official political power in the region 
as the then Austro-Hungarian Empire was dismantled by the victorious Allied powers at 
the Paris Peace Conference.  Under the direction of Tomas Masaryk and his lieutenant, 
Edvard Benes, the Czech leadership abroad labored the allied leadership in London, 
Washington, Paris and Rome for the creation of a separate Czech State.  In order to 
lend additional credibility to this new nation-state, Masaryk, Benes, and other Czech 
nationalists promoted the nineteenth century idea of a mythical medieval Czech state 
that was once the beacon of democracy in Eastern Europe before it fell into the hands 
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of the barbarian Germans.  Masaryk argued that a Czech state would create the buffer 
necessary to contain Germany, and separate the rest of Europe from the Red 
communist menace brewing in the Soviet Union. 
 The Allies ratified the creation of a multinational state known as Czechoslovakia.  
Within the territory appropriated for this new state, three and a half million Germans 
found themselves transplanted under a new national flag.  Though Masaryk remained a 
declared republican and proponent of democracy, his subordinates, specifically Benes, 
pressured the president for additional legal measures to restrict the participation of 
Germans in the national government while granting them real participation in local 
Sudetenland governments.  Even with this tightening of restrictions upon the Germans 
in Czechoslovak society, individuals still maintained their transience of identity impeded 
only moderately by their physical appearance.  When Benes succeeded Masaryk, the 
continued pressure on the Germans limited but did not eliminate those who could act as 
members of each group. 
 The Munich Conference of 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War in 
1939 ushered in another chapter in Czech-German relations.  The Nazi Third Reich 
under Adolf Hitler sought to absorb all of the territories that contained substantial 
numbers of Germans and ultimately the expansion of Germany to the territories to the 
East.  Within the Nazi plans, the newly created Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
(from parts of Czechoslovakia) would be populated with Germans while the majority of 
the Czech population would be enslaved or removed, ultimately changing the ethno-
racial makeup of the region.  To oversee the Germanization of the Protectorate, Hitler 
appointed Konstantin Von Neurath as the Reichsprotektor.  Neurath recognized the 
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impracticality of the forced migration of all or the majority of the Czech population, which 
would leave the Protectorate desolate.  Further complicating his assignment was the 
immense mixing between racial groups that existed in the region.  The region’s 
industries, specifically the Skoda Works, were important suppliers of war material for the 
entire Reich.  Instead, Neurath convinced Berlin that the mixing of German and Czech 
blood in the region made most of the population suitable for Germanization.  Slowly 
Neurath proceeded with the approved plans for the Germanization of the population, but 
he feared an uprising of Czechs and permitted them to express national identity, which 
the Czech president-in-exile, Edvard Benes hoped to transform into acts of solidarity 
and resistance. 
 As the intensity of these acts grew with the continuation of the war, the Nazi 
leadership sought a change in the administration of the Protectorate, and for that 
purpose, Hitler appointed the security chief, Reinhard Heydrich, as the Reichsprotektor.   
Heydrich brought with him an incredible military discipline and personal belief in the 
racial ideology of the Reich.  He immediately cracked down on the resistance 
movements, and increased the deportations of Jews and Gypsies.  He further created 
concrete racial delineations between the ethic Germans and ethnic Czechs.  This 
process polarized society in the Protectorate between the two groups, while 
simultaneously maintaining a tenuous peace.  The pacification of Czech society 
enraged Czech President-in-Exile Edvard Benes who immediately pressured the 
resistance groups for a high profile action that would get the attention of the Allied 
Powers.  The assassination of Reinhard Heydrich as planned by Benes led to the 
destruction of the Czech village of Lidice in reprisal, as well as the immediate and 
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devastating crackdown on nationalist and communist resistance groups in the region.  
While internationally this helped to solidify Benes’ position for the reestablishment of the 
Czechoslovak state, Czechoslovak resistance was rendered virtually nonexistent for the 
remainder of the war and only manifested itself in small-organized work slowdowns and 
absenteeism. 
 Abroad Benes continued to lobby the Allied leadership for its approval of his 
postwar policies that would remake the ethnic map of Czechoslovakia by forcing the 
deportation of the region’s Sudetendeutsche and Volksdeutsche in the interest of a 
lasting peace, while pointing to the two world wars caused by the Germans as 
justification for his policies.  The massacre at Lidice solidified the provisional support of 
the Allies, and enabled Benes to begin planning the deportations.  Through radio 
addresses and speeches, Benes called upon the population of Czechoslovakia to 
welcome and assist the Red Army, ensure the capture of all collaborators, and begin 
the deportations of those determined to have supported the Nazi Occupation of the 
Czechoslovak state.  On May 5, 1945, the historical relationship between Czechs and 
Germans was fundamentally transformed.  The remnants of the Czech resistance rose 
up and crushed the German troops charged with holding the city.  The Czechs then 
went about the capture of all suspected war criminals, which boiled down to 
collaborators of all ethnicities, and ethnic groups thought to have collaborated.  In other 
words, being German made a person guilty of collaboration.  During these “wild times” 
of deportations, the Czech national committees and the population in general 
incarcerated thousands of Germans while simultaneously raping, pillaging, and 
plundering with the Red Army soldiers that had liberated them. 
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 The Czech national committees, under the direction of the Kaschau Program and 
the Benes’ Decrees, forced other Germans to depart their dwellings with little or no 
personal belongings and marched or transported them by train to the German or 
Austrian borders.  Those who were not deported initially faced repeated acts of brutality 
from Czechs and Red Army personnel, and then after having their personal property 
stripped from them, they too were deported to Germany or Austria.  Czech President 
Edvard Benes only paid lip service to Allied declarations that had demanded the 
“orderly and humane” transfer of populations in the Potsdam Agreement.  The Czech 
national committees carried out the execution of convicted prisoners within two hours of 
the pronouncement of sentence.  The forced marches to the borders and the conditions 
on the trains left thousands dead from exposure, malnutrition, and disease.  Within the 
Czech laws, particularly the Great Decree and the Kaschau Program, there was little 
differentiation made between collaborators and Germans.  The creation of temporary 
governance in the liberated areas did very little to curtail the actions that first occurred 
during the wild times. 
 The Czech national committees also adopted Nazi-style practices against the 
Germans themselves.  The Czechs separated, concentrated, and deported the 
Germans who were not of some use to the state.  The Czechs imprisoned many 
Germans in the same concentration camps that once housed Jews, Roma, and others.   
Some Germans were utilized in forced labor, made to wear identifying armbands, and 
faced additional acts of violence and retribution.  Once again, not all, or even 
necessarily a majority of those individuals who suffered these fates were in fact active 
collaborators or even individuals who approved of the Nazi occupation forces.  The 
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outside force of the German Third Reich acted upon, changed, and transformed the 
relationship between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia.  No longer was 
there a common ground that had permitted both groups to continue to coexist.  By the 
end of the deportations, the Germans who remained in Czechoslovakia were a sparse 
few when compared with the millions who once called the former Austrian crown lands 
home. 
 The explanation of Czech-German relations as a competition between the two 
groups has no merit because these relations were made far more complex through 
coexistence, cooperation, intermarriage, and the transience of identity.  Neither of the 
groups had sought the destruction or removal of the other group and only acted to 
elevate one group over the other.  The creation of the Nazi Third Reich, with its racial 
ideology and dogma combined with its desired geographical expansion to include 
regions beyond Germany’s 1919 borders, introduced an additional force in the 
relationship.  The systematic Nazi operations to purify its territories through the 
deportation, concentration and extermination of those deemed racially unfit, especially 
the Jews and Roma, created the psychological breakthrough necessary to make the 
removal of a troublesome minority a logical possibility.  The Nazi Third Reich also 
provided models for carrying out mass population transfers.  Without the overarching 
protection of the Third Reich and the Wehrmacht, the Germans left behind were at the 
mercy of the vengeful Red Army and liberation governments. 
 The actions of the Czechoslovak administration, and those of other central and 
east European states, in the aftermath of the Second World War, created one of the 
largest humanitarian crises in world history.  The Czech government kept its promise to 
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prosecute and punish individuals who collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces, but 
it also punished the Germans who were citizens of Czechoslovakia prior to the war, 
through ethnically motivated laws designed to cleanse the state of minority populations.  
In other words, without necessarily denouncing all Volksdeutsche as collaborators, the 
Benes government made it the logical conclusion when the national committees 
enforced the laws.   
 However, the impact of these deportations extended far beyond the 1948 
Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia.  Following the 1989 collapse of the Communist 
regime, many Germans opposed the expansion of the European Union to include the 
Czech Republic until the Czechs renounced and repealed the Benes decrees.  Despite 
multiple legal opinions from throughout the European Union that declared the decrees 
had no effect on the Czech Republic’s participation in the Union, many Germans 
believed that it was a direct affront to Germany that they be admitted with the decrees 
still intact.  Even more infuriating for Germans were Czech opinion polls that 
demonstrated continued popular support for the Benes’ decrees.  Not only in the 
German view were the Czechs unapologetic, they still espoused support for the policies 
of ethnic cleansing established by the Benes government.  The accession of the Czech 
Republic to the European Union did very little to quell Czech public sentiment in favor of 
the Benes decrees, as currently a significantly large portion of the Czech public still 
approves of the laws, while only a minority favors their repeal. 
 For the many Czechs and Germans, the Benes Decrees and their consequences 
remain ever-present.  At the end of history’s deadliest war, the injustices continued.  
While the Benes Regime punished many true collaborators, many more individuals that 
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were innocent, faced deportation and their own mortality aboard the very trains that 
once transported thousands of Jews and Roma to extermination camps in the East.  
Though this study in no way seeks to equate the Holocaust with the postwar expulsions, 
it does seek to change our understanding of the dramatic change in the relationship 
between Czechs and Germans in the course of less than a decade.  In truth, the Nazi 
occupation authorities and the Benes administration altered forever the historical 
relationship between Czechs and Germans, and redefined it as an existential conflict 
that still plagues both Czech and German societies today. 
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